The Politics of Impossibility: A Socio-Symbolic Analysis of Society, the Subject, Identification, and Ideology by Dodson, Thomas A
 
The Politics of Impossibility: A Socio-Symbolic Analysis of Society,
the Subject, Identification, and Ideology
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Dodson, Thomas A. 2003. The politics of impossibility: A socio-
symbolic analysis of society, the subject, identification, and
ideology. Master's Thesis, Ohio State University.
Accessed February 18, 2015 11:17:11 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4505804
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAATHE POLITICS OF IMPOSSIBILITY: 
A SOCIO-SYMBOLIC ANALYSIS OF SOCIETY, IDENTIFICATION, AND 
IDEOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for  
the Degree Master of Arts in the  
Graduate School of the Ohio State University 
 
By 
Thomas Aaron Dodson, B.A. 
* * * * * 
 
 
The Ohio State University 
2003 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Eugene Holland, Advisor              Approved by 
 
Dr. Barry Shank             
 
Dr. Ethan Knapp          ______________________________ 
                          Advisor 
                Department of Comparative Studies  ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Page 
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv 
 
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  v 
 
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  vi 
 
Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  vii  
 
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii 
 
Chapters: 
 
1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
 
     1.1  Il n'y a pas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
     1.2  From a theory of the sign to discourse theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
 
2.  Why is society impossible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   16   
 
      2.1  Y2K, or the problem of undecidability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  16 
      2.2  Discourse and the field of discursivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21 
      2.3  The logic of equivalence: the discursive articulation of social 
  antagonism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   28 
      2.4  Social fantasy: between reality and the Real . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35 
 
3.  Why is the subject impossible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   45 
 
      3.1  Every identity is a failed identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    45 
      3.2  Identification in Freud and the dilemma of desire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    48 
      3.3  Imaginary identification and alienation in the symbolic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   55 
 
4.  How Does Ideology Mask Impossibility? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   66  
 
      4.1  The end of ideology? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66 
      4.2  Towards A General Theory of Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76 
      4.3  Ideological Identification: Obedience, Transference, and Cynicism . . . . . . . . . 81   iii 
5.  Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86 
     5.1  Artful bigotry and kitsch: irony, racism, and cynical ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
     5.2  Axiomatization and Dislocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
 
List of References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
The present study seeks to explain why every discursive articulation of society 
must fail both to constitute itself as a closed totality and to fully symbolize and give 
meaning to individual subjects.  It further seeks to explain how this symmetrical lack in 
society and the social agent contributes to our understanding of the multiple and flexible 
structures of ideological (dis)identification.  This model of society and the subject will 
draw primarily from the discourse-theoretical analytics developed by Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe and extended by others.  Often referred to by the terms “discourse 
theory” or "hegemony theory," this body of work applies semiotics, deconstruction, 
psychoanalysis, and post-Gramscian Marxism to contemporary social struggles.  The 
present study also draws significantly from Lacanian psychoanalysis and from those 
theorists (notably Yannis Stavrakakis and Slavoj Zizek) who have begun to articulate a 
distinctively Lacanian political theory.  v 
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“Il n’y a pas de hors-texte”
--Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology
“Il n'y a pas de métalangage”
--Jacques Lacan, Seminar XIV
1.1 Il n'y a pas
  “There is no outside-text.”  “There is no meta-language.”1  Each of these 
aphorisms, one belonging to postsructuralism and the other to psychoanalysis, presents 
the impossibility of any position outside of concrete discourses from which to interpret or 
critique their truth-effects.  Derrida’s formulation suggests that concepts have no 
existence independent of their articulation within a network of interconnected texts; there 
is no stable truth that is transcendental in relation to the discursive and historical contexts 
through which it is produced and deployed.  A preliminary reading of Lacan’s statement 
yields a similar claim, that there is no neutral enunciative position from which one can 
comment upon ordinary utterances, fixing their meaning once and for all. There is no 
1 Derrida’s often-quoted statement can be found in Of Grammatology (158).  The quote from 
Lacan originates from Seminar XIV: La logique du fantasme, which (to the best of my 
knowledge) remains unpublished at the time of this writing and is available only in the form of 
unedited French typescripts. 2
methodology or style of commentary that can provide mastery over the surplus of 
meaning that is produced by every signifying practice.2 
Thus, Derrida and Lacan both assert that no discourse can serve as the neutral 
language through which the truth claims of other discourses may be evaluated.  The 
absence of any decontextualized position of enunciation has important implications for 
social critique, which, in its classical mode at least, endeavors to rend the veil of false 
consciousness in order to reveal actual relations of exploitation and domination.  If, 
however, there is no mode of analysis that can claim unmediated access to truth or 
objectivity, then how can we identify a discourse or a consciousness as “false”? If, rather 
than describing reality or expressing truth, signifying structures produce these as their 
effects, then what becomes of the category of distortion?  
In addition to raising troubling questions about the position (or even the 
possibility) of social critique, the propositions of deconstruction and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis also call into question any description of society as a structural totality.  
Contrary to the axioms of Western metaphysics, Derrida argues that structures do not 
possess anything like fixed centers or essences that could establish secure limits on the 
combination and substitution of structural elements.  In the absence of a stable center, no 
ordered set of relations can ever achieve the status of a coherent and unified totality.  
Further, Derrida suggests that every process of ordering produces a surplus that limits and 
2 See Slavoj Zizek’s “Which Subject of the Real?” in Sublime Object of Ideology for a discussion 
of this statement by Lacan (153-199).3
subverts totalization. The inevitability of surplus ensures the persistence of a contested 
terrain of unfixity that escapes articulation by any single structure.
Lacan approaches the failure of totalization through a discussion of the symbolic 
order, a network of differential relations between signifying elements that provides the 
categories and identities through which subjectivity and social reality are produced.  
Lacan’s symbolic order is a failed structural totality, a discursive complex that maintains 
the illusion of its consistency through a set of constitutive exclusions.  Upon the founding 
of a symbolic order, these gaps in symbolization retroactively produce a set of distortions 
in social and subjective reality.  Lacan identifies this warping of the discursive weave 
with a register of human experience that he terms “the Real.”  For Lacan, the Real also 
represents an ineradicable negativity that every process of symbolic structuration fails to 
master.  The Real is not only that which occupies the site of lack in a symbolic structure, 
but also the pre-symbolic non-meaning that founds the process of symbolization.  At the 
level of the individual subject, this pre-symbolic Real is associated with the substance of 
the living body that cannot be fully integrated into the symbolic.
There are, of course, significant differences between Derrida’s account of the 
impossibility of structural closure and the one offered by Lacan.  Some have sought to 
“correct” deconstruction in terms of Lacanian psychoanalysis (notably Zizek) or to 
present them as opposed schools of thought.  Derrida is accused, for example, of 
occluding the presence of bodily existence, and Lacan’s conception of the pre-symbolic 
Real is aligned with the hoary tradition of “occidental metaphysics.”  In the present 4
analysis, however, we argue that a thorough account of the failure of structural totality 
requires insights from both theorists.  
If the claims of deconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalysis dislocate the 
conventional categories of social theory, the present study seeks to respond to the need to 
provide alternative formulations of society, the subject, and social critique.  Society can 
no longer be taken for granted as a self-identical, empirical object; neither should it be 
regarded as a structural totality characterized by a set of intelligible and stable relations 
between the elements or levels that make it up.  Instead, we should regard structured 
networks of social relations as socio-symbolic orders, discursive formations limited by 
their failure to master a field of surplus meaning and haunted by the traces of an 
ineradicable negativity.  It follows from this conception of the social order as a failed 
structural totality that the articulation of every social identity must also be precarious and 
incomplete.  There are no closed systems of differences or self-contained essences that 
could provide the basis for a politics of identity. There are, instead, discursively 
constructed subject positions that mobilize a politics of identification and performative 
citation.  Finally, in the absence of an extra-discursive or metalinguistic position from 
which to critique ideological distortion, it becomes necessary to identify ideology with 
those discourses and objects of desire that conceal the impossibility of structural totality 
and stable identity.
The principles for this approach to social theory and critique will be drawn not 
only from Derrida and Lacan, but also from the discourse-theoretical analytics developed 
by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.  In their foundational text, Hegemony and 5
Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe offer a discursive theory of the social that rejects 
the notion that social agents posses essential identities or that society can be regarded as a 
sutured totality.  We will also draw from the emerging field of Lacanian political theory, 
especially from the work of Yannis Stavrakakis and Slavoj Zizek, in order to specify the 
unique ontological status of social antagonism and to provide an account of the 
constitution of social fantasies in terms of the Lacanian concept of the Real.
Chapter two develops a semiotics of the social that recognizes the impossibility of 
structural closure.  The social order is discursively constructed by practices of articulation 
that order signifying elements (both linguistic and non-linguistic) according to logics of 
difference and equivalence.  This order shares a number of features with the Lacanian 
symbolic order, especially the notion that the symbolic always fails to constitute itself as 
a sutured totality.  This chapter also explores the failure of the socio-symbolic order 
through a discussion of undecidability, chains of equivalence, social antagonism, and that 
chimerical entity which Lacan refers to as “the Real.”
Chapter three poses the question: “why is the subject impossible?”  Here we 
suggest that every identity is a failed identity. The subject can only achieve a semblance 
of stability and coherence through practices of identification with images, signifying 
elements, and objects of desire.  These identifications, however, are always ambivalent 
and alienating.  The specular image projects a vision of consistency, yet always remains 
external.  The discourses of the socio-symbolic order offer meaningful social identity, yet 
they also demand that the subject-to-be sacrifice that portion of bodily enjoyment which 
they cannot symbolize. 6
In the following chapter, “how does ideology mask impossibility,” we propose a 
general theory of ideology as the non-recognition or disavowal of the impossibility of 
society and the subject.  The constitutive lack that characterizes both the socio-symbolic 
order and structural identity is denied through identificatory practices that take as their 
objects nodal points, signifiers, discursive positions, images, and objects of desire that 
incarnate the impossible closure of that order or that seem to offer the promise of stable 
identity.  This chapter also develops a model of ideological identification adapted from 
Lacanian schemas of alienation and separation in order to account for both naïve and 
cynical ideological practice.
Before moving on to an account of the social order in terms of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse theory, it will be helpful to first sketch the development of the 
theories of signification leading up to its constitution as a frame of analysis.  This detour 
will establish some basic principles that will be crucial to the subsequent elaboration of 
the discursive construction of the social.  We will examine the theories of Ferdinand de 
Saussure and the formalization of his structural linguistics into a “science of the sign,” 
and then proceed to the radicalization of semiotics through Lacan’s theory of the signifier 
and Derrida’s critique of logocentrism and structural totality. 
1.2 From a Theory of the Sign to Discourse Theory  
Unlike classical linguistics, which seeks to explain the historical development of 
language through time, Ferdinand de Saussure utilizes a synchronic analysis to explain 
how linguistic structures produce meaning.  Saussurean linguistics approaches language 
as a system of rules for combination and substitution (la langue), which both used and 7
produced by individual speech acts (la parole).  Saussure’s analysis of language rejects 
the common sense notion that language is “a naming-process—a list of words, each 
corresponding to the thing that it names.”  Denying that words have any natural, 
unmediated relation to the objects they constitute, Saussure develops a theory of the 
linguistic sign as a “two-sided psychological entity.”  The sign does not consist of “a 
thing and a name,” but rather of “a concept and a sound-image” that Saussure designates 
respectively, a signified and a signifier (Saussure 65-66). 
Based upon this formulation of the linguistic sign, Saussure famously concludes, 
“in language there are only differences without positive terms” (120).  The signifier, or 
mental sound-image, has no positive existence as a term outside of its relationship to 
other terms within a language.  The sound-image [pe´r], for example, has no intrinsic 
identity or positive existence outside of its relative variance, within a particular system of 
differences, from other signifiers such as [de´r] and [te´r].  The same is true of a signified 
such as “democracy,” which only takes on meaning through its relations to such concepts 
as  “communism,” “despotism,” and so forth.
Saussure also made it clear that the relationship between the two “sides” of the 
sign, the signifier and the signified, is “arbitrary” and “unmotivated” (67).  The signifier 
has “no natural connection with the signified” (Saussure 69).  The signified “pear” is 
linked to the signifier [pe´r] in English and to the signifier [pwar] in French.  There is, 
therefore, no natural connection between the sound-image [pe´r] and the idea of a sweet 
juicy fruit with green skin.  Each sign, “pear” in English and “poire” in French, is the 
result of the combination, according to the formal rules provided by its respective 8
language, of a signified and a signifier.   The production of meaning, for Saussure, is the 
result of parallel differences between signifiers and signifieds operating according to a set 
of structural relations.  
It must be admitted that there are a number of problems with Saussure’s model.  
Chief among them is the claim that there is an isomorphic relationship between the 
signifier and the signified.  As Stavrakakis explains, “Saussure retains the concept of 
difference as applicable only to the levels of the signifier (the ‘sound pattern’) and the 
signified (the ‘concept’) when viewed independently from one another.  Viewed together 
they produce something positive: the sign” (23-24).  In order to maintain that signifiers 
and signifieds operate in exactly the same way (through relations of difference) while 
also claiming that the sign is split, it becomes necessary to distinguish between phonic 
and conceptual substances.  It is, however, a logical contradiction to look to substance to 
explain the purely formal operation of language.  Such an appeal is not unlike trying to 
explain the rules of chess by distinguishing between pieces that are made of plastic and 
those that are made of stone (Torfing 87). Without the support of an illegitimate appeal to 
substance, asserting an isomorphic relation between these two registers must “necessarily 
lead to the collapse of the distinction between signifier and signified (and the dissolution 
of the category of the sign)” (Laclau “Identity” 69).  
It was Hjemslev and his colleagues who carried out this “dissolution.”  Imposing 
a stricter formalization, the Copenhagen School broke down Saussure’s signifier and 
signified into smaller units, phonemes and semes, each set possessing its own rules of 
combination (Torfing 88; Laclau “Identity” 69).  The separation of Saussurean linguistics 9
from notions of phonic and conceptual substances, and its further formalization by 
Hjemslev and others expanded its applications beyond linguistic analysis.  The move 
from a theory of the linguistic sign to a general theory of signifying systems (semiotics), 
meant that structural linguistics’ “general principles of analysis” could now be applied to 
such disparate cultural productions as fashion, advertising, film, literature, and art 
(Torfing 89).  The social semiotics of discourse theory expands this analytic framework 
even further by investigating the discursive construction of social and political identities.  
It does so, however, by submitting formal semiotics to both the Lacanian theory of the 
signifier and to the poststructuralist critique of structural totality.
 In Lacan and the Political, Stavrakakis provides a concise statement of Lacan’s 
radicalization of the structuralist theory of the sign: “meaning is produced by signifiers; it 
springs from the signifier to the signified and not vice versa” (25).  This represents a 
reversal within semiotics for, as Derrida has demonstrated, the structural division of the 
sign into signifier and signified has always implicitly privileged the latter.  The 
partitioning of the sign is, in fact, another manifestation of the time-honored metaphysical 
“distinction between the sensible and the intelligible” (Derrida OG 13).  Such a 
distinction serves the end of isolating meaning or “intelligibility” from the merely 
“sensible” signifier.  This division reflects a desire for “a signified able to ‘take place’ in 
its intelligibility, before its ‘fall,’ before any expulsion into the exteriority of the sensible 
here below” (Derrida OG 13).  To imagine such a pure signified requires that the signifier 
be figured as lack, dispersion, and difference in relation to a full, unified, and self-
identical plenitude of meaning.  A signified constituted in this way would be 10
transcendental in relation to the sign; it would be pure meaning, anterior to and ultimately 
separate from any discursive articulation.
Contrary to this metaphysical prejudice in favor of the signified, Lacan asserts the 
autonomy of the signifier.  The signifier does not transparently express a pre-given 
meaning; meaning is an effect of the relations between signifiers and their articulations 
within signifying chains.   In “The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious,” Lacan 
writes the relationship between the two terms as S/s: “the signifier over the signified, 
'over' corresponding to the bar separating the two stages” (Ecrits 141).  Rather than two 
terms in an isomorphic relationship or two sides of a single positive entity (the sign), 
Lacan designates the signifier and the signified as corresponding to two “distinct 
orders” (Ecrits 141).  The order of the signifier operates as a “system of differential 
couplings,” each signifier linking to others “according to the laws of a closed 
order” (Lacan Ecrits 144).  A signifying chain is a set of such links between signifying 
elements, one that also always refers to other chains.  Lacan suggests that we imagine a 
signifying chain as something like a set of “links by which a necklace firmly hooks onto a 
link of another necklace made of links” (Ecrits 145). 
This dense interlocking mail of signifiers introduces into the theory of 
signification “an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier” (Lacan Ecrits 145).  
As Stavrakakis explains, “every signification refers to another one and so on and so forth; 
the signified is lost in the metonymic sliding characteristic of the signifying chain” (26). 
For example, imagine that the protagonist in a gangster movie breaks open a window 
with the butt of his tommy gun and shouts, “Get down! It’s the law!,” before firing madly 11
at a car pulling into the driveway. If we understand the signifier “the law” to refer directly 
to the signified concept of a rule of conduct, we are likely to find this statement very 
confusing.  The sense of the statement, however, actually depends upon the combination 
of one word, “the law,” with another to which it is formally related, “police officer.” In 
such cases we find that meaning is produced by nothing other than a “word-to-word” 
connection, a link between signifiers (Lacan Ecrits 148). 
The “sliding of the signified” that Lacan refers to is also due to the diachronic 
dimension that metonymy introduces into the signified: “the signifier, by its very nature, 
always anticipates meaning by deploying its dimension in some sense before it” (Ecrits 
145).  This is to say that meaning never keeps pace with the unfolding of a chain of 
signification, but is always left behind, runs ahead, circles back, or is endlessly delayed. 
Saussure was forced to exclude this diachronic dimension from the signified in order to 
retain the notions of stable units of meaning and the isomorphism of the signifier and the 
signified. 
Lacan draws equally on Jakobson’s notion of metaphor to develop his theory of 
signifying chains.  For Lacan, metaphor designates the substitution of “one word for 
another,” rather than their combination (Ecrits 148).  In a synecdoche, such as the one 
offered earlier, there is a relation of contiguity between the terms—“the law” is a whole, 
which refers to a part of itself that acts as its instrument, “a police officer.”  Metaphoric 
relations, however, are based upon an assumed similarity between the terms.  Returning 
to our gangster picture for a moment, let us imagine that the protagonist has just 
perforated the squad car with a burst of automatic weapons fire.  With the proud defiance 12
typical of these characters, he shouts, “take that pig!”  We can be assured that a similarity 
is being asserted between “police officer” and “pig,” as the terms lack anything like a 
formal contiguous relationship.    
It might be disputed at this point that the relationship between the signs “law” and 
“police officer,” and “police officer” and “pig” are not at the level of signifiers, as Lacan 
claims, but at least in part at the level of signifieds.  As we have seen, figuring the 
distinction between signifier and signified in this way results in the contradictory position 
of appealing to an essential difference between two kinds of substances, one phonic and 
the other conceptual.  Still, if one must collapse any ultimate distinction within the sign 
between the signifier and the signified, why then assert the autonomy of the former as 
Lacan does?  
Since the final aim of Lacan’s application of Jakobson’s theory of metaphor and 
metonymy is to describe the linguistic functioning of the unconscious, it is only 
appropriate to turn to a clinical example to resolve this issue.  In his discussion of Lacan 
in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, Laclau offers an answer to this question through 13
a reference to Bruce Fink’s reading of a classical case study.  Fink summarizes the well-
known case of Freud’s “Rat Man” in this way:
As a child, the Rat Man identified with rats (Ratten) as biting creatures 
that are often treated cruelly by other humans, he himself having been 
severely beaten by his father for having bitten his nurse.  Certain ideas 
then become part of the “rat complex” due to meaning: rats can spread 
diseases such as syphilis, just like man’s penis.  Hence rat = penis.  But 
other ideas become grafted onto the rat complex due to the word Ratten 
itself, not its meanings: Raten means installments, and leads to the 
equation of rats and florins; Spielratte means gambler, and the Rat Man’s 
father, having incurred a debt gambling, becomes drawn into the rat 
complex. (Fink 22)
Laclau notes that some of the connections between elements in the “rat complex” 
operate by means of “a passage through the signified” (the link between “rat” and 
“penis”), while others (the association of “installments” with “rat” and “gambler”) 
are linked solely at the level of signifiers (“Identity” 70).  What the two different 
kinds of connection have in common “is a displacement of signification 
determined by a system of structural positions in which each element (conceptual 
or phonic) functions as a signifier” (“Identity” 70).  Once it becomes clear that 
every signifying element “acquires value only through its reference to the whole 
system of signifiers in which it is inscribed,” it is no longer possible to maintain a 
necessary distinction between signifier and signified (Laclau “Identity” 70).
Derrida parallels Laclau when he challenges the illegitimate division 
between phonic and graphic substance that leads Saussure to privilege speech 
over writing: “from the moment [. . .] that one recognizes that every signified is 
also in the position of signifier, the distinction between signifier and signified 14
becomes problematical at its roots” (Positions 26).  Thus, we should avoid the 
fallacy of constructing differences between signifying terms on the basis of a 
metaphysical distinction between substances.  “No element can function as a 
sign,” Derrida tells us, “without referring to another element” (Positions 26).  
He concludes that “each ‘element’” whether signified or signifier “is 
constituted only on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the 
chain or system” (Positions 26).  No element in a signifying chain can be 
constituted as a simple unit of conceptual meaning, the metaphysical 
understanding of the term signified.  Each element—be it conceptual, verbal, 
graphic, etc.—only takes on meaning through the differential relations between it 
and other elements in the chain.  This explains Laclau’s statement that “the 
primacy of the signifier should be asserted, but with the proviso that signifiers, 
signifieds and signs should all be considered as signifiers” (“Identity” 70).
If meaning is the result of the combination and substitution of signifying 
elements according to their relations in a signifying chain, then it seems that 
meaning could proliferate endlessly.  The most common complaints against 
poststructuralist theories of signification find their basis in this potentially 
limitless polysemy: if the signified always “slides,” and if mechanisms such as 
metaphor and metonymy allow signifiers to enter into an effectively infinite 
number of displacements and condensations, then it seems that one can argue that 
a sign or a text can signify anything one wants it to.  These objections needn’t 
delay us here, however.15
With his term point de capiton, Lacan accounts for the partial fixation of 
meaning within a signifying chain. As he explains in his seminar on the 
psychoses, “everything radiates out from and is organized around this signifier, 
similar to these little lines of force that an upholstery button forms on the surface 
of material.  It’s the point of convergence that enables everything that happens in 
[ . . .  a] discourse to be situated retroactively and prospectively” (Lacan III 268).   
Points de capiton, which social discourse theory refers to as nodal points, are 
empty signifiers that retroactively stabilize a group of floating signifiers by 
partially fixing their meaning.  
  The concept of discursive formations, regulated by nodal points that 
impose a partial closure, provides a compelling alternative to the notion of 
structural totality.  In the absence of an essence, a fixed center that provides the 
single organizing principle of the structure, final closure is impossible.  As 
Derrida explains, the notion of a decentered structure becomes synonymous with 
discourse: “it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center [. . .] that it 
was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite 
number of sign-substitutions came into play.  This was [. . .] the moment when, in 
the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse” (“Structure” 280).  
In the next chapter, we will examine in more depth the implications of a 
discursive approach to society that recognizes both the impossibility of structural 
closure and the inevitability of a surplus of meaning that escapes fixation.16
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CHAPTER 2 
WHY IS SOCIETY IMPOSSIBLE?
2.1 Y2K, or The Problem of Undecidability
At first, the theoretical arguments offered in this chapter about the constitutive 
lack within the social field that prevents its final closure as society are likely to seem 
somewhat removed from everyday social reality.  Yet, at the turn of the millennium it 
seemed to many that a single, widespread instance of structural instability might result in 
a cascading failure of our social-technological systems, possibly even precipitating a 
global nuclear catastrophe.  News organizations, government agencies, and groups such 
as the Co-Intelligence Institute and the Cassandra Project predicted that the “year 2000 
problem” could result in a disruption of flows in currency and oil, the loss of power in 
cities throughout the world, the release of toxic chemicals or radiation into populated 
areas, the collapse of the international banking system, or even the accidental launch of 
the Russian nuclear arsenal. 
Setting aside these apocalyptic fantasies for the moment, we find in the Y2K 
problem the crisis of an undecidable structure.  Many computers and programs, along 
with chips embedded in common devices, vehicles, and industrial machinery were simply 
incapable of symbolizing the year 2000. Because dates are used as a reference points for 18
a variety of calculations, programmers typically record dates as dd/mm/yy. By shaving 
the first two digits off of every four-digit year programmers are able to economize 19
memory, compounding the savings over millions of calculations. This presented a 
problem in the year 2000, however.  It was feared that when presented with a “00,” most 
computers would simply process the numbers as “1900.”  
The appearance of “00” after the orderly progression of a series of numbers (97, 
98, 99 . . . ) can be registered as the reiteration of the first number in the set (00), as a 
circling back to the beginning.  Alternately, it can be registered as the beginning of a new 
sequence that will follow the pattern of the first.  There is nothing internal to this string of 
numbers (00, 01, 02 . . . 97, 98, 99, 00) that provides a rule for which of these two 
possibilities is to be expressed and which is to be repressed.  There is, then, nothing about 
this chain of signifiers that provides the basis for choosing one possibility over the other.   
As Laclau suggests, “no structure can find within itself the principle of its own 
closure” (“Discourse” 433).
An undecidable structure such as this one requires that a force, partially external 
to it, impose a decision about which organizing principle will stabilize it (Laclau 
“Discourse” 433).  The failure of the structure to fully determine the relationships 
between its elements makes such a decision possible: “a decision can only come into 
being in a space that exceeds the calculable program” (Derrida Limited 116). To 
recognize that a structure is undecidable is not, however, to suggest that it is 
indeterminate.  20
The Y2K problem perfectly illustrates Derrida’s point that “undecidability is 
always a determinate oscillation between possibilities . . . these possibilities are 
themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations” (Limited 148).  The 
appearance of “00” in this string of numbers can only be explained by a limited number 
of principles. Thus, although the meaning of this string is not completely fixed, it is not 
completely open either.
Before the intervention of concerned programmers, one of two structural 
possibilities was operable—the second iteration of “00” registered as “1900.”  
Afterwards, the second iteration of “00” registered as “2000.”  In either case, the 
stabilization of the structure does not rely only on the necessary unfolding of its internal 
logic, but rather on a contingent decision, a force that acts on the structure but is not fully 
determined by it.  The apparent closure of every structure is actually the result of such 
decisions “between structural undecidables” that in imposing one principle, represses 
those “possible alternatives that are not carried out.” (Laclau New 30).  The claim that 
closed structures, totalities, and positive objects are all the results of “decisions taken in 
an undecidable terrain” constitutes a significant break from forms of political theory that 
regard society, social relations, and social agents as empirically given (Laclau 
“Discourse” 435). 
By recognizing the undecidability of every structure, a discourse theoretical 
approach denies the possibility of any fixed and immutable center that can, in advance, 
account for how relationships between structural elements will develop. In an early essay, 21
Derrida argues that the category of structure “has always been neutralized or reduced” in 
Western philosophy by attaching it to a center or placing it in relation to “a point of 
presence” or “a fixed origin” (“Structure” 278).  This center is supposed to provide the 
singular and fundamental organizing principle of a given structure.  As such, it acts to 
“orient, balance, and organize” the structure, while itself evading the process of 
structuration:  “thus it has always been thought that the center, which is by definition 
unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which while governing the structure, 
escapes structurality” (Derrida “Structure” 278-279).
  Derrida explains that the function of such a center, or essence, is to limit the 
“play” within a structure, to restrict “the permutation or transformation of its 
elements” (“Structure” 279).  The center acts as the organizing principle of the structure, 
establishing the syntax by which structural elements can be combined and exchanged. 
Regulating the relationships between structural elements, but escaping the process of 
structuration, the center is also “the point at which the substitution of contents, elements, 
or terms is no longer possible” (Derrida “Structure” 279).  In economist models of 
society, for example, the internal logic of the economic level determines the form and 
function of other levels of the social totality.  It not only provides the principles by which 
elements from these levels can be altered and arranged, but also imposes strict limits on 
this activity.  Thus, although “the center of a structure permits the play of its elements 
inside the total form,” it nonetheless “closes off the play which it opens and makes 
possible” (Derrida “Structure” 278-279). 22
In Saussurean linguistics, the role of the center was played either by the 
autonomous subject or by the transcendental signified. This insistence on an essentialist 
conception of structure presented a considerable obstacle to the development of discourse 
as a theory of de-centered structures.  In the first case, the unfolding of the signifying 
chain is dictated by “the whims of the speaker and does not present any structural 
regularity graspable by a general theory” (Laclau “Discourse” 432).  In the second, the 
isomorphism between the signifier and the signified results in the production of the sign 
as a positive entity.  In order to maintain the dualistic conception of the sign, Saussure 
appealed to a distinction between essences, one phonic and the other conceptual.  The 
signified, as an intelligible unit of conceptual meaning existing anterior to any 
articulation in a sensible signifier, functions as the transcendental center of all 
signification.3
Beginning with the increased formalization of Saussure’s theory of the sign by 
Hjemslev and the glossematic school of Copenhagen, structural linguistics began to 
overcome these limitations and to develop into a general theory of meaningful structures 
(Laclau “Discourse” 433).  As we noted in the introduction, Hjemslev refined Saussure’s 
model of the sign by subdividing the signifier and signified into smaller units, thereby 
rejecting the essentialist conception of the sign as a positive entity (Laclau “Discourse” 
432).  By investigating the institutional and linguistic structures that determine “what is 
‘sayable’” in a given context, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault and others questioned the 
structuring role of an autonomous subject (Laclau “Discourse” 433).  
3 See Derrida’s Of Grammatology, “The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing” 23
Poststructuralist developments further demonstrated that the identity of signifying 
elements within a discourse cannot be fixed through reference to a stable, transcendental 
signified.  As the theories of Jakobson and Lacan indicate, the signified cannot be 
conceptualized as an unchanging unit of conceptual meaning bound to a particular 
signifier.  The identity of the signified is, instead, contingent upon the diachronic 
unfolding of a chain of signifiers.  Signifiers owe their identities, which are never 
completely fixed, to a system of structural relations between signifying elements.  
Without the structuring force of the signified acting as a stabilizing center, the 
substitutions, combination, or displacement of signifiers is only limited by the formal 
operations of metaphor and metonymy. 
  This is not to say that, in the absence of a fixed center, relations between 
structural elements can proliferate infinitely or haphazardly.  Still, the movement from 
structural totality to discourse has (sometimes willfully) been misinterpreted as the 
absence of any organizing principle, the opening of structure to the unfettered play of its 
elements.  Derrida, however, categorically rejects this position: “first of all, I never 
proposed a kind of ‘all or nothing’ choice between pure realization of self-presence and 
complete freeplay or undecidability” (Limited 115).  The move to a conception of 
structure as de-centered and undecidable does not entail the “complete freeplay” of 
structural elements: “there can be no ‘completeness’ where freeplay is 
concerned” (Derrida Limited 115).  A discourse theoretical approach to the social field 
recognizes that every configuration of social relations is undecidable and incomplete.  
Because their development cannot be reduced to the movement of an internal logic, 24
structural relations are always partially determined by an external exercise of power, a 
decision.
2.2 Discourse and the Field of Discursivity
As we have seen, “discourse” should be understood as a general theory of 
structure that moves beyond conventional distinctions “between the linguistic and the 
extra-linguistic” (Laclau “Discourse” 431).  “Discourse” does not merely “refer to a 
particular set of objects, but to a viewpoint from which it [is] possible to redescribe” the 
production of identity and meaning in our social reality (Laclau “Discourse” 433). To 
consider the social field in terms of discursive practices rather than structural totalities 
and transcendent essences is also to move beyond the “positivity of the social” (Laclau 
and Mouffe 93).  This approach recognizes that “society and social agents lack any 
essence,” and that these obtain their consistency only from the “relative and precarious 
forms of fixation which accompany the establishment of a certain [socio-symbolic] 
order” (Laclau and Mouffe 98).  
Discourse, then, does not merely reflect or communicate a set of positive, pre-
existing social relations, but rather “constitutes and organizes” them as such (Laclau and 
Mouffe 95).  This conception of discourse sets a socio-symbolic analysis apart from other 
forms of political analysis, which often treat discourse as the ideas and beliefs of 
empirically given social agents.  Far from playing a secondary role, discourses constitute 
the objects that we encounter in our collective reality and articulate the positions that are 
available to us as social agents.  If Lacan found that “the unconscious is structured like a 
language,” discourse theory discovers that the same is true of the social field.25
In New Theories of Discourse, Jacob Torfing provides a rigorous and precise 
formulation of discourse: “a differential ensemble of signifying sequences that, in the 
absence of a fixed centre, fails to invoke a complete closure” (Torfing 86).  Torfing’s 
definition embraces discourse theory’s conception of structure as a de-centered 
assemblage of structural elements lacking any single, stable principle of organization.  
The identities of the structural elements do not depend upon reference to an essence or a 
totality.  Identities are derived, instead, from the formal, differential relationships that 
elements establish with one another as the signifying chain unfolds.  
Despite the poststructuralist formalization of the concept, the contemporary 
notion of discourse continues to be confused with “language” and “ideas.”  A socio-
symbolic analysis, however, does not seek to examine the rhetorics and ideas of 
empirically given social agents, but to account for the discursive construction of social 
reality.  In order to occupy our collective reality, every meaningful object and social 
identity must be discursively articulated.  It must be defined, at least in part, in terms of 
its differential relations with other signifying elements in an assemblage.  
This is not to say that subject positions and recognizable objects are simply 
linguistic constructions or mental projections.  Laclau and Mouffe are emphatic that “the 
fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with 
whether there is a world external thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition” (108).  
Of course, we are constantly encountering contingent events.  Yet, if these are to be 
integrated into our reality, they must be assigned an identity through a discursive 
articulation.  As the authors explain: 26
An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in 
the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will.  But 
whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural 
phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God,’ depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field.  What is denied is not that such objects 
exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could 
constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive conditions of 
emergence. (Laclau and Mouffe 108)
If an object or event is to possess identity and meaning, it must be given a place in 
relation to other elements within a signifying chain. An event may certainly occur that 
cannot be articulated by the discursive formations that make up the social order.  Such an 
event, however, cannot be thought in the category of “object.”  Without symbolic 
identity, it is not an object at all, but rather a traumatic irruption of non-meaning into 
social reality.  If it appears to us at all, its presence will be spectral and uncanny.
  With the formalization of discourse as a theoretical concept, the opposition 
between the non-discursive and the discursive is surpassed.  The social field can no need 
no longer be divided into “an objective field constituted outside of any discursive 
intervention, and a discourse consisting of the pure expression of thought” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 108).  As we have seen, there is no primordial objectivity that can be separated 
from any discursive conditions of emergence. Without this boundary of essence between 
the non-discursive and the discursive, a formal analysis discovers that social formations 
always possess a discursive character: 
if the so-called non-discursive complexes—institutions, techniques, 
productive organizations, and so on—are analysed, we will only find more 
or less complex forms of differential positions among objects, which do 
not arise from a necessity external to the system structuring them and 
which can only therefore be conceived as discursive articulations. (Laclau 
and Mouffe 107)27
Material social formations are always discursive.  They are “relational systems of 
differential entities,” the development of which cannot be explained through reference to 
any “objective necessity (God, Nature, Reason)” (Torfing 90).  Discursive structures are 
also always material.  The structural elements that make them up may be linguistic or 
extra-linguistic: “the linguistic and non-linguistic elements are not merely juxtaposed, but 
constitute a differential and structured system of positions—that is, a discourse” (Laclau 
and Mouffe 108).  
The appearance of a “7.0 Earthquake” in our social reality, for example, requires 
that an ordered set of relationships be established between a set of particularly violent 
tremors, the Richter scale, a set of devices used to measure seismic activities, a set of 
rules for making statements, a set of institutions (including professional relationships, 
textbooks and scientific journals, laboratories, etc.), and a subject position (seismologist) 
with the enunciative authority to categorize just these kinds of events.  As this example 
demonstrates, we find within every discursive entity “a dispersion of very diverse 
material elements” (Laclau and Mouffe 108). 
In order to explain the formation of differential positions, it will be necessary to 
introduce several interconnected terms from Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy.  The authors use the term articulation to refer to “any practice 
establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of 
the articulatory practice” (105). The term moment designates a differential position that is 
articulated within a concrete discourse.  Element, by contrast, is “any difference that is 28
not discursively articulated” (Laclau and Mouffe 105).  The distinction between moments 
and elements is not between the discursive and the non- or extra-discursive.  It refers, 
rather, to the degree of fixity/unfixity of signifying elements (Torfing 92-93).  If a 
discourse is  “a system of differential entities—that is, of moments” that fails to achieve 
final closure, then “such a system only exists as a partial limitation of a ‘surplus of 
meaning’ which subverts it” (Laclau and Mouffe 111).
Discourse theory labels this undecidable terrain of surplus meaning the field of 
discursivity.  A conception of the social field as discourse, as a de-centered and 
incomplete structure that can never achieve totalization or closure, rules out the 
possibility that society could ever be constituted as a fixed system of differences.  The 
impossibility of closure requires that there always be differences that escape articulation 
by any one discourse.  Thus, Laclau and Mouffe argue that “’Society’ is not a valid object 
of discourse.’  There is no single underlying principle fixing—and hence constituting—
the whole field of differences” (111).  If the articulation of elements into moments can 
never be completely carried out, there will always remain within the social  “a field of 
undecidability which constantly overflows and subverts the attempt to fix a stable set of 
differential positions” (Torfing 92).  This field is not simply extra-discursive, for just as 
the pure “interiority of a fixed system of differences” is impossible, so is “pure 
exteriority” (Laclau and Mouffe 111).  For an element to be completely exterior to 
discourse, it would have to be completely internal to itself.  Such an entity would be a 
self-contained essence, not a structural element.  Thus, the elements within the field of 
discursivity are not completely external to the moments of established discourses.  29
Although elements may enter into manifold structural relationships with discourses, their 
identities (unlike those of moments) are not fixed by them.  Elements, then, are 
equivalent to floating signifiers that do not possess anything like a fixed meaning, but 
vary widely according to their discursive context.
Lacking a totalizing center, discourse can never impose a complete 
fixation of the field of discursivity.  To assert that there is nothing that escapes 
differential articulation within some discourse is, paradoxically, to slip back into 
the positivist position.  One has retained the idea of a full positivity, merely 
transferring it from “an extra-discursive ground to the plurality of the discursive 
field” (Laclau “Death” 299).  As Laclau cautions, “in the same way that we have a 
naturalistic positivism we can have a semiotic or phenomenological 
one” (“Death” 299).  Discourse theory avoids a relapse into positivism by 
maintaining the openness of the field of discursivity as an ineradicable surplus 
that prevents the closure of every discourse.30
Although there always remains a “surplus of meaning” that escapes 
articulation, discourses do maintain a relative closure.  In order to account for this 
partial fixation of meaning, discourse theory draws from Lacan’s discussion of the 
point de caption, or quilting point.  Laclau and Mouffe use the term nodal point to 
refer to empty signifiers that limit “the productivity of the signifying chain” (112).  
These signifiers play an important role in the stability of discursive structures, for 
“a discourse incapable of generating any fixity of meaning is the discourse of a 
psychotic” (Laclau and Mouffe 112).
As we noted earlier, nodal points retroactively stabilize groups of 
signifying elements by partially fixing their meaning.  Slavoj Zizek offers a 
relevant example when he suggests that within the discourse of Communism, 
“class struggle” serves as such a nodal point: 
’class struggle’ confers a precise and fixed signification to all other 
elements: democracy (so-called ‘real democracy’ as opposed to ‘bourgeois 
formal democracy’ as a legal form of exploitation); to feminism (the 
exploitation of women as resulting from the class-conditioned division of 
labor); to ecologism (the destruction of natural resources as a logical 
consequence of profit-oriented capitalist production); to the peace 
movement (the principal danger to peace is adventurist imperialism); and 
so on. (87-88)
Until a nodal point fixes their meaning within a given discourse, elements are free 
to “float” without settling upon a particular signification.  The nodal point is 
always “empty,” having no fixed signification of its own4.  Yet, because it serves 
the structural function of retroactively joining signifiers to one another in a 
4 For a more in depth account of the empty character of nodal points, see Laclau’s “Why do 
Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?” in Emancipation(s) (Verso 1996, 36-47).31
relatively stable chain, it is often mistaken for an essence, a transcendental source 
of meaning that becomes a site of identification and “mythical 
investment” (Stavrakakis 60).  For Laclau and Mouffe, the practice of articulation 
consists of the construction of nodal points that transform elements into the 
moments of a discourse. 
2.3 The Logic of Equivalence: The Discursive Articulation of Social 
Antagonism
The ordering of discourses and discursive fields relies upon the 
complementary logics of difference and equivalence. To this point we have been 
primarily concerned with the logic of difference.  Semiotics, for example, refers to 
this logic when it concludes that the identities of signifiers are defined solely by 
their difference from one another within a particular discourse.  The expansion of 
relations of difference is checked, finally, by the lack of a center that could 
impose a final totalization upon the field of discursivity.  The surplus that 
accompanies any partial fixation of meaning is not, however, the only force that 
subverts the transformation of elements into moments (Torfing 96).
As Laclau and Mouffe explain, one of the factors barring the totalization 
of the logic of difference is the countervailing logic of equivalence: 
the condition for a full presence [e.g., a structural-discursive 
totality] is the existence of a closed space where each differential 
position is fixed as a specific and irreplaceable moment.  So the 
first condition for the subversion of that space, for the prevention 
of that closure, is that the specificity of each position should be 
dissolved. (127)32
The logic of equivalence carries out just this dissolution by linking the differential 
positions together into a new signifying chain within which they are made 
equivalent. In order to be equivalent, two terms must first be different from each 
other.  Equivalence, then, “creates a second meaning which, though parasitic on 
the first, subverts it: the differences cancel one another out insofar as they are 
used to express something identical underlying them all” (Laclau and Mouffe 
128).  The discourse of the global justice movement, for example, does not fail to 
articulate differences between its constituent groups: organized labor; students; 
environmentalists; feminist, queer, and anti-racist activists; “black bloc” 
anarchists; etc. These movements and their particular struggles are not rendered 
identical, but are made equivalent by virtue of their common opposition to 
neoliberal discourse and to the excesses of global capitalism.
The interplay between the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence 
provides the basis for the structuring of the social and political field.  Although 
the logic of difference plays the primary role in establishing the identities of 
objects and subject positions within discourses, the logic of equivalence plays an 
equally crucial role in establishing the limits of concrete discourses.  It does so not 
by reference to a center that unifies all of the differential positions, but “by means 
of excluding a radical otherness that has no common measure with the differential 
system from which it is excluded, and that therefore poses a constant threat to that 
system” (Torfing 124).33
Chains of equivalence are also attempts to discursively articulate those 
forces of social antagonism which prevent the closure of the social field: 
“antagonisms [. . . ] constitute the limits of society, the latter’s impossibility of 
fully constituting itself” (Laclau and Mouffe 125).  In discourse theory, 
antagonism does not refer to mere hostility or to an objective or logical relation 
between terms. As Zizek explains, antagonism “is neither contradiction nor 
opposition but the ‘impossible’ relationship between the two terms: each of them 
is preventing the other from achieving its identity with itself, to become what it 
really is” (Zizek “Beyond” 251).  This radical alterity, signified through chains of 
equivalence, acts as an ineradicable obstacle to the expansion of the differential 
logic of discourse.
A contemporary example can serve to clarify these points.  The response 
of the Bush administration to the attacks upon the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon represents the articulation of an antagonizing force through the 
expansion of a chain of equivalence.  In a state of the union address delivered in 
January of 2002, President Bush declared that Iran, Iraq, North Korea “and their 
terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil” (par. 21).  The President also suggested 
that this alliance of nations represents the “world’s most dangerous regimes,” an 
affiliation of rogue states that “threaten us with the world’s most destructive 
weapons” (“Delivers” par. 23).  In an earlier speech, delivered to the United 
Nations General Assembly one month after the attacks, Bush argued that 
“civilization, itself, the civilization we share, is threatened” by “enemies that hate 34
not our policies, but our existence” (“Remarks” par.12, 37).  In this new global 
war, it is claimed, there is no neutrality: “nations are either with us or against us in 
the war on terror” (“Calls” par. 14).
In his speech to the nation, Bush signifies the differential entities “Iran,” 
“Iraq,” and “North Korea” in terms of a chain of equivalence. The term “axis” 
suggests an alliance between states with a set of shared interests and objectives 
such that they can be understood as constituting a single identity.  In order to 
regard these nations as an “axis,” the differential identities of each must be 
subverted.  Within the discourse of the war on terror, these regimes are equivalent 
by virtue of being “evil,” that is, by developing weapons of mass destruction that 
threaten the United States (whether wielded by the nations themselves or by 
terrorists who somehow acquire these weapons from them).  
In order to articulate this equivalence, the specific political, social, and 
cultural differences between each country must be undermined.  To regard these 
states as an “axis” the particular relations between them (or their indifference to 
one another) must also be suppressed.  Iran and Iraq have a long history of 
conflict and remain bitter enemies.  For its part, North Korea has never had 
significant diplomatic or military associations with either Iran or Iraq.  Within this 
discourse, each discursive moment that once signified Iran, Iraq, or North Korea 
is transformed by the logic of equivalence and  “acquires the floating character of 
an element” (Laclau and Mouffe 127).  35
The more moments that are pulled into the chain of equivalence, the more 
that each is drained of its specificity and meaning.  The result is not the creation 
of a new identity that would provide a legitimate place for the antagonizing force 
in the discursive system.  The emptiness of the term “axis of evil” is due to the 
fact that within the discourse of the war on terror, it is constructed as a negation of 
the discourse rather than as a moment within it—the only positive characteristic 
assigned to these regimes is that, collectively, they represent a threats to “us” and 
“civilization.”  
Within the discourse of the war on terror, the “axis of evil” does not 
represent a physical force opposed to “civilization” in the same way that two 
colliding objects are opposed to each other.  Social forces are not physical objects, 
and any discussion of them in terms of opposition is entirely metaphorical (Laclau 
and Mouffe 123).  Discursively articulated social forces are not simply conceptual 
either, and the antagonisms between them cannot be explained in terms of logical 
contradiction.  As Laclau and Mouffe observe, “we all participate in a number of 
mutually contradictory belief systems, and yet no antagonism emerges from these 
contradictions.  Contradiction does not, therefore, necessarily imply an 
antagonistic relation” (124).  The “axis of evil” does not simply contradict the 
logic of civilization; it threatens the existence of civilization.  
The relationship between “civilization” and the “axis of evil” cannot be 
expressed in terms of A / B.  The “axis of evil” does not possess a positive and 
complete identity, the characteristics of which can simply be contrasted to 36
“civilization.”  Neither can the axis be reduced to “non-A.”  That which is not “A” 
simply differs from “A” in some way.  Such a difference could be domesticated as 
a moment within a discourse of “civilization.”  Here, however, the axis of evil is 
actually “anti-A,” the active negation of civilization.  According to the discourse 
of the war on terror, the antagonizing force does not represent a counter-discourse 
opposed to “our policies,” but a force of radical negation, an incarnate evil that 
“hates our existence.”  The differences between these countries only matter in the 
chain of equivalence insofar as they express the same identical “evil” and 
“hatred.”  At the extreme of absolute equivalence identity becomes purely 
negative.  
What the ideological understanding of antagonism overlooks is the 
impossibility of closure.  Prior to any antagonistic force threatening it, every 
discursive identity is already incomplete: “if identities are only differences within 
a discursive system, no identity can be fully constituted unless the system is a 
closed one” (Laclau “Discourse” 433).  “A,” in the first place, is never completely 
“A.”  The discursive articulation of antagonism relies upon the illusion that it is 
possible for society to achieve complete self-identity as a closed system of 
differences.  It is further posited that that this (imaginary) closure and stability is 
threatened and subverted only by an external, antagonistic force.  With the 
annihilation of the antagonist, it is promised, the constitution of that impossible 
object, “society,” is assured.  Or, as President Bush expresses it, “we know that 
evil is real, but good will prevail against it” (“Remarks” 39). 37
Within a given social field, neither the logic of difference nor the logic of 
equivalence will dominate completely (Torfing 125).  Although chains of 
equivalence may subvert the differential character of discursive positions, 
“equivalential condensation is never complete.  If society is not totally possible, 
neither is it totally impossible” (Laclau and Mouffe 129).  With the expansion of 
the logic of difference, identities proliferate and the social field becomes more 
complex.  By contrast, the expansion of the logic of equivalence results in “the 
simplification of the political space” (Laclau and Mouffe 130).  
Within the present national rhetoric we find precisely this condensation of 
the discursive field.  The war on terror reduces the complexity of international 
relations to “a clear-cut political frontier” which divides the world into two 
antagonistic camps, those who are “with us” and those who are “against 
us” (Torfing 126).  Clearly, the impact of the expansion of the logic of 
equivalence is not limited to those who are “against us.”  We are called on, in the 
war on terror, to “act, first and foremost, not as Republicans, not as Democrats, 
but as Americans” (Bush “Delivers” par. 27).  
The threat posed by evil forces imposes “a certain sameness” upon the two 
political parties (Torfing 125).  As articulated in the discourse of the war on terror, 
the two parties are united as “Americans,” equivalent in their common 
commitment to “justice,” “liberty” and “freedom.”  Yet, the differential identities 
of these terms is also subverted by the chain of equivalence.  They begin to 
acquire the character of floating elements, signifying only the fullness of 38
community that is threatened by evil (Torfing 125).  The disarticulation of these 
signifiers from their partial fixations within concrete discourses has produced 
disturbing results. Those suspected of committing acts of terrorism may be denied 
due process and detained indefinitely in the name “justice;” wiretapping and other 
forms of electronic surveillance may be used against protestors in the defense of 
“liberty;” and dissenting journalists and intellectuals may be intimidated, 
harassed, or fired because of the threat that they pose to “freedom.”  
It is a mistake to dismiss the discourse of the war on terror as cynical 
manipulation or “empty rhetoric,” as a distortion of political reality (although it is 
certainly that as well).  We should recognize it as an attempt to reformulate the 
discursive bounds of (Western) “civilization” and the United States (“us”).  
Whether or not it finally succeeds in stabilizing the social field in terms of the 
nodal points “good” and “evil,” “civilization” and “terror,” “us” and “them” 
depends entirely upon the outcome of a political struggle for hegemony.  Because 
of the open and incomplete character of the social, a variety of hegemonic forces 
compete to fix floating elements as moments of their own discourses.  The role of 
political struggle in the articulation of social reality is more or less pronounced 
depending upon the relative fixity of a given social order.  That is to say, “the 
hegemonic dimension of politics only expands as the open, non-sutured character 
of the social increases” (Laclau and Mouffe 136).  
The collective trauma of the September 11 attacks acted to dislocate the 
social field, disturbing the fixity of differential relations and expanding the field 39
of discursivity.  Thus far, it appears that the political right has been better able to 
recognize and take advantage of this opportunity to rearticulate the social in terms 
of its opposition to an antagonistic other—“we are all Americans now.”  As we 
will see in our next section, this projection of the impossibility of structural 
closure onto an antagonistic other that prohibits it is precisely the structure of 
social fantasy.
2.4 Social Fantasy: Between Reality and the Real
To this point we have been concerned with the undecidability of every 
structure, the distinction between discourse and the field of discursivity, and the 
discursive articulation of social antagonism through the logic of equivalence.  All 
of these phenomena relate to what Lacan refers to as the symbolic register of 
human experience. As we have seen, the impossibility of society can be 
understood as the inability of signifying structures to articulate the social field as 
a discursive totality. Yet, as Stavarakakis points out, “if symbolization is never 
total then something must always be escaping it” (48).  This “something” is the 
Lacanian Real.  In order to explain the phantasmatic construction of social reality, 
it will be necessary to analyze the relation between discursive articulation and that 
paradoxical Thing which is “simultaneously both the hard, impenetrable kernal 
resisting symbolization and a pure chimerical entity which has in itself no 
ontological consistency” (Zizek SO 169). 
In Lacan’s seminars and writings, the symbolic order (or the Other) refers 
to the external signifying network that determines, and may even be said to 40
produce, the subject.  In his teachings, Lacan also emphasized that the Other is 
always lacking, that it does not exist as a closed and consistent totality.  It is not 
surprising that a discourse analytic approach to the social field should have so 
much in common with Lacan’s statements about the symbolic   Lacan’s discussion 
of the symbolic order built upon and radicalized the structural linguistics of de 
Saussure and Jakobson.  Discourse theory, in turn, appropriated and adapted 
concepts from Lacan—the production of the signified by the signifier, the logics 
of metaphor and metonymy, the function of points de capiton/nodal points.  
Lacan’s conception of the symbolic order cannot be reduced to discourse (the 
Other as language).  However, the description of the social field provided by 
discourse theory may be regarded as a partial account of the “socio-symbolic 
order.”  Approaching the social field as a socio-symbolic order allows us to draw 
upon elaborations of the Lacanian Real and the structure of fantasy.5  
In offering an initial definition of the Lacanian Real, we may render it as 
that which is lacking in the symbolic order.  As we noted earlier, every object that 
we encounter in our collective reality must be constructed as an object of 
discourse; it must be symbolized.  This necessity does not, however, preclude the 
possibility that collective traumas and other contingent events may occur that 
have no place in a particular socio-symbolic order.  In fact, it follows from the 
impossibility of discursive closure that there must be exclusions and gaps in every 
5 We will reserve our discussion of the imaginary register and a more precise discussion of the 
symbolic order in Lacanian theory for the following chapter.41
social order, and that these are not accidental, but constitutive.  The Real is the 
distortion produced in social reality when a given socio-symbolic order 
encounters what is impossible for it to symbolize if it is to remain consistent and 
intelligible.
Our present discourses, for example, are perfectly capable of signifying 
earthquakes of various magnitudes.  Regardless of the death and destruction they 
may cause, such events can be integrated into our existing social reality.  
Encounters with the Real do not involve pulling away the curtain in order to 
reveal the “objective reality” or “brute materiality” of an event outside of any 
discursive articulation—e.g., the “simple fact” of an earthquake or its “literal” 
tremors.  The irruption of the Real entails precisely the opposite; it is the “shock 
of a contingent encounter which disrupts the automatic circulation of the symbolic 
mechanism . . . a traumatic encounter which ruins the balance of the symbolic 
universe” (Zizek SO 171).    Its presence is not marked by a lapse into certainty (it 
was, after all, only an earthquake), but rather by a disturbing experience of 
unreality.   This is why, in his explanations of the Real, Zizek so often turns to the 
science fiction and horror stories for his examples.  
More than any others, these genres stage the failure of social reality to 
retain its stability and coherence in the face of that Thing which has no place 
within it.  In the classic film Poltergeist, for example, an invisible, spectral force 
threatens a suburban family.  It begins by moving furniture, changing channels on 
the television, and tickling the residents.  By the film’s conclusion, however, this 42
nameless force has bitten into flesh, spirited away the family’s daughter, and 
invested quite ordinary objects—a suburban home, a clown doll, a dead tree, a 
television screen—with a fantastic, terrifying character.  Soon after the 
disturbances begin, the family looks for outside help: "I already looked in the 
Yellow Pages. Furniture movers we got. Strange phenomenon, there's no 
listing" (Poltergeist).  The Real is precisely that for which there is no listing, that 
which has not been assigned a place in the symbolic.  Thus, the Real is not simply 
external to the symbolic, but is the retroactive effect of its failure (Laclau, 
“Identity” 68).  
There is, however, another, “pre-symbolic” dimension of the Real.6  For 
Lacan, this dimension is associated with the infant’s experience of unity with the 
mother’s body before the acquisition of language, or more generally with an 
experience of the living body that is unmediated by symbolization.  The pre-
symbolic Real, then, is often retroactively fantasized as a state of undifferentiated 
wholeness and satisfaction.  We will have more to say in the following chapter 
about the subject’s traumatic entry into the symbolic order and the loss of pre-
symbolic enjoyment.  For now, it suffices to recognize that the concept of the Real 
refers not only to a failure of symbolization, but also to “the starting point, the 
basis, the foundation of the process of symbolization” (Zizek SO 169).
6 For the remainder of this study we will use the term “the Real” to refer to that dimension of the 
Lacanian Real that is the retroactive product of the failure of the symbolic.  We will use the term 
“pre-symbolic Real” to refer to the radical non-meaning that founds the process of symbolization 
and is associate in Lacan with the enjoyment of the living body.  Thus, we use “the Real” to refer 
to the specific gaps within particular symbolic orders, and “the pre-symbolic Real” to refer to that 
which disrupts every symbolic order. 43
The Real in this sense is the ground of the symbolic, the traumatic non-
meaning that resists discursive articulation.  The process of symbolization cuts 
down this radical negativity, but there are always scraps, remainders, and leftovers 
that disturb the smooth functioning of the symbolic.  The pre-symbolic Real, then, 
is “an entity which, although it does not exist (in the sense of ‘really existing’, 
taking place in reality), has a series of properties—it exercises a certain structural 
causality, it can produce a series of effects in the symbolic reality of 
subjects” (Zizek SO 163).
Clearly, there is a very real danger of misunderstanding the pre-symbolic 
Real as a kind of essence.  We have defined an essence as a positive entity that 
maintains its ontological consistency while determining the relationships between 
structural elements.  The reference of every structural element to an essence also 
provides the basis for structural closure.  The Real, by contrast, cannot serve as 
such a reference.  It disrupts discursive structures rather than stabilizing them.  
Further, because the Real can only be posited through the distortions it brings 
about in the symbolic order, it cannot be said to possess any ontological 
consistency.  The Real is an essence that does not exist.  It is an entity that does 
not guarantee totalization, but blocks it.  We should resist the temptation to 
dismiss out of hand the Lacanian concept of the Real as a contradictory or 
nonsensical concept, for the “immediate coincidence of opposite or even 
contradictory determinations is what defines the Lacanian Real” (Zizek SO 171).44
The concept of the Real is valuable to socio-symbolic analysis because it 
provides a framework within which to theorize that force of negation that prevents 
the final closure of society.  In his account of the Winnebago tribe, Claude Levi-
Strauss discovered just this force of radical negation: the Real of social 
antagonism.  The Winnebago’s were hierarchically divided into two sub-groups.  
When called upon to draw a visual representation of their village, members of the 
dominant group drew a circle within a circle, oriented around the central temple.  
Members of the subordinate group drew a single circle split in half by a clear line 
of demarcation.  The standard, relativist reading of this difference would likely 
assert that members of each group simply perceive the actual organization of 
physical and social space in different ways.  Zizek, however, argues that:
The very splitting into the two ‘relative’ perceptions implies a 
hidden reference to a constant—not the objective, ‘actual’ 
disposition of buildings but a traumatic kernel, a fundamental 
antagonism the inhabitants of the village were unable to symbolize, 
to account for, to ‘internalize’, to come to terms with—an 
imbalance in social relations that prevented the community from 
stabilizing itself into a harmonious whole.  The two perceptions of 
the ground plan are simply two mutually exclusive endeavors to 
cope with this traumatic antagonism, to heal its wound via the 
imposition of a balanced symbolic structure. (Zizek “Class” 112)
The conflicting representations of the Winnebago’s communal space both 
refer to the social antagonism that prevents the closure of the social field.  As the 
hard kernel that resists the closure of society as a harmonious whole, social 
antagonism is the Real of the socio-symbolic order. It is unfortunate that in this 
and subsequent works, Zizek has sought to reduce the Real of antagonism to an 45
archaic and uncritiqued formulation of class struggle.  For reasons that should, by 
now, be obvious, it is incoherent to assign a class character to that force which 
resists symbolization and prevents the closure of society.7 
If we follow Lacan’s teachings regarding the relationship between the 
symbolic and the Real, we must conclude that social reality requires the support 
of a fantasy structure that serves as its defense against the Real.  Social fantasies 
mask the impossibility of society by positing some external other that prohibits its 
constitution as a well-ordered whole.  As Stavrakakis explains, “the social fantasy 
of a harmonious social or natural order can only be sustained if all the persisting 
disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder” (65).  Through fantasy, social 
antagonism is displaced onto an alien other who supposedly prohibits what is 
already impossible.  The impossible fullness of society is presented as possible by 
means of its prohibition.  The fantasy promises that, once the antagonistic other is 
annihilated, the present incompleteness of the social will be overcome and things 
will “return to normal.”  This “return to normal” is a return to “a lost state of 
harmony, unity, and fullness” that is nothing other than a retroactive production of 
the fantasy—a projection of fullness into the pre-symbolic Real (Stavrakakis 52).
The discourse of the war on terror, with its fixation on “security” and 
“terror” provides a clear example of the operation of social fantasy.  America, 
7 If the social ﬁeld is founded, once and for all, on this single, Real antagonistic division then 
there is hardly any need for a socio-symbolic analysis of the social.  In other words, one might as 
well declare as irrelevant all of the theoretical advances outlined thus far and become an orthodox 
Marxist.  See Laclau’s critique of Zizek’s class reductionism in Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality.46
prior to the September 11th attacks, is posited as secure and free from fear.  Within 
this fantasy, the only obstacle prohibiting a return to this impossible fullness is the 
existence of the enemy as an embodiment of “terror” and “evil.”  If the fantasy is 
to be traversed, it must first be recognized that the impossibility of society is not 
the result of a positive, external obstacle. Although the choice of the alien other 
onto which the failure of society is projected is not purely arbitrary, it remains, 
nevertheless, a projection (Laclau “Structure” 198-199).  
This is the point that Zizek wishes to make regarding Nazism:
What we are tempted to say is that the Nazi anti-Semitic violence 
was ‘false’ in the same way . . . betraying an inability to confront 
the real kernel of the trauma (the social antagonism).  So what we 
are claiming is that anti-Semitic violence, say, is not only ‘factually 
wrong’ (Jews are ‘not really like that’ exploiting us and organizing 
a universal plot) and/or ‘morally wrong’ (unacceptable in terms of 
elementary standards of decency, etc.), but also ‘untrue’ in the 
sense of an inauthenticity which is simultaneously epistemological 
and ethical [. . .] even if the rich Jews ‘really’ exploited German 
workers, seduced their daughters, dominated the popular press, and 
so on, anti-Semitism is still an emphatically ‘untrue,’ pathological 
ideological condition—why?  What makes it pathological is the 
disavowed subjective libidinal investment in the figure of the Jew
—the way social antagonism is displaced-obliterated by being 
‘projected’ into the figure of the Jew.  (“Class” 126-127)
In Lacanian theory, truth is not to be found in the symbolic register, but in the 
Real.  Thus, the displacement of the impossibility of society onto the figure of the 
Jew is untrue because it fails to recognize the Real of social antagonism.  
Antagonism is constitutive of every social field, and the promise of closure 
offered by anti-Semitism can never be fulfilled.  The phantasmatic figure of the 
Jew blocks a fullness that is always already impossible.  Further, Nazism is 47
inauthentic in that it repressed the enjoyment invested in the figure of the Jew as a 
fascinating object that conceals the failure of the socio-symbolic order to 
constitute itself as society.  It is inauthentic because it refuses the encounter with 
the Real of antagonism and desire.
A similar critique can be offered of the war on terror.  To reach the level of 
social fantasy, it is not enough to point out that it is “factually incorrect” to 
describe Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as a formal alliance of terrorist states.  
Neither is it sufficient to condemn the loss of civil liberties through reference to 
the ethical norms of liberal democracy.  An analysis of the war on terror as a 
social fantasy requires a recognition that the annihilation of Al-Qaeda, the “axis of 
evil,” etc. will not result in the achievement of a harmonious society. Such a 
society is impossible a priori because the pre-symbolic Real, in the form of social 
antagonism, is constitutive of the social field. 
In August 17, 2002, the 115th birthday of Marcus Garvey, thousands of 
African American activists converged on Washington, D.C. to demand reparations 
from the United States government. In his speech to the demonstrators, Rev. 
Herbert Daughtry suggested that the “innocence” and “security” lost after 
September the eleventh never existed for many citizens:
those who are experiencing fear today as a result of September the 
eleventh–I just want to say to you: ‘welcome to Black America’ 
[. . .] We have lived with terror so long that we have normalized it 
[…] we have been subjected to terror as no other people.48
The projection of the impossibility of constituting America as a well-
ordered whole onto an alien other acts to displace the traumatic antagonisms 
within America onto an external enemy.  As with anti-Semitism, this fantastic 
structure is untrue because it fails to acknowledge that antagonism is an 
ineradicable feature of every socio-symbolic order.  As Rev. Daughtry’s remarks 
make clear, it is also inauthentic—the Real trauma of racist violence is disavowed 
by positing that victory in the war on terror will allow a “return” to an America 
posited as secure and free from terror.49
CHAPTER 3
WHY IS THE SUBJECT IMPOSSIBLE?
3.1 Every Identity Is A Failed Identity
Every identity is, necessarily, a failed identity.  Because every socio-symbolic 
order fails to constitute itself as a closed system of differences, every social identity must 
remain partial and incomplete.  To take up a place within social reality, the subject-to-be 
must recognize itself in the representations of a collective imaginary and in the signifiers 
made available by discourses.  By identifying itself with images and discursive moments, 
this subject gains a semblance of stability and coherence.  Yet, because identity can only 
be obtained by way of “a detour through the other,” the social subject must give up 
unmediated access to that aspect of its being which the social order cannot articulate 
(Fuss 2).  Clearly, such an account of the formation of political subjects cannot be 
contained within the terms of the (now stale) opposition between class struggle and 
identity politics.  What is needed, instead, is a psychoanalytic political theory that 
recognizes that “the politics of the subject, the politics of identity formation, can only be 
understood as a politics of impossibility” (Stavrakakis 35). 
Key psychoanalytic concepts of identification, alienation, lack, and enjoyment are 
uniquely suited to the theoretical terrain opened by the poststructuralist dislocation of 50
idealist and essentialist conceptions of the subject.  Psychoanalysis, especially the 
thought of Jacques Lacan, is capable of providing an account of the subject that does not51
seek reduce it to a biological essence or to a structural emanation. The psychoanalytic 
subject provides a model that can fully embrace the poststructuralist critique of conscious 
present subjectivity while also avoiding its excesses.  Because psychoanalysis has never 
located subjectivity in an autonomous consciousness, the much-hailed “death” of the 
Cartesian subject need not entail the dissolution of the subject as an analytic category.  In 
particular, a conception of the social agent adapted from the Lacanian subject allows us to 
acknowledge the impossibility of structural closure and, thus, of full identity, while also 
referring to a subject that, although it lacks any independent ontological consistency, 
persists in excess of structural determination.
The theory of identification, as presented in Freud and Lacan, will provide the 
basis for our explanation of the subject’s efforts to gain a stable identity through a relation 
to the social order.  As Diana Fuss explains, identification and its failure explicitly stages 
the impossibility of the subject: “identification is a process that keeps identity at a 
distance, that prevents identity from every approximating the status of an ontological 
given, even as it makes possible the illusion of an identity as unmediated, secure, 
totalizable” (2).  For Freud, the desire to be the other, an ambivalent desire that may take 
the form of rivalry just as easily as adoration, is responsible for the formation of the ego 
as the seat of conscious subjectivity.  
The ego emerges as a sedimentation of disappointments, love-objects that the 
subject has attempted to internalize in order to avoid losing them entirely.  Although 
instructive, the theory of identification in Freud’s writing remains flawed and incomplete.  
Diana Fuss and Judith Butler offer productive critiques and expansions of Freud’s theory, 52
eschewing any simple opposition between desire and identification and examining those 
identifications that the subject has disavowed.  Jacques Lacan introduces a distinction 
between imaginary and symbolic identifications and, unlike Freud, places the ego in the 
field of objects rather than as an agency within the subject.  
Lacan also foregrounds the alienating dimension of identification; even when 
internalized, the images and signifiers that represent the subject retain their foreign 
character.  The constitution of the subject within the social field, what Judith Butler terms 
subjection, is the result of a choice between a meaningless existence and an alienated 
existence in subordination to the socio-symbolic Other:
Bound to seek recognition of its own existence in categories, terms, and 
names that are not of its own making, the subject seeks the sign of its own 
existence outside itself, in a discourse that is at once dominant and 
indifferent.  Social categories signify subordination and existence at 
once  . . . within subjection the price of existence is subordination. (PLP 
20)
Clearly, this is no choice at all.  In order for its existence to have meaning, for itself and 
for others, the subject-to-be must allow itself to be articulated through social and 
linguistic categories.  To refuse a place in the socio-symbolic order is, finally, to slip into 
the abyss of non-meaning or delusion, to occupy a psychotic universe.
Staging the scene of subjection as the identification of a subject-to-be with the 
categories provided by the social Other raises the question of the ontological status of this 
subject.  As Butler explains, “the figure to which we refer has not yet acquired existence 
and is not part of a verifiable explanation . . . the paradox of subjection implies a paradox 
of referentiality: namely, that we must refer to what does not yet exist” (PLP 4).  In a 53
manner that parallels our previous discussion of the Real in the social field, the choice of 
the subject prior to subjection can only be hypothesized through its distortions in the 
psychic life of an already alienated subject.8 
3.2 Identification in Freud and the Dilemma of Desire  
In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud grounds his explanation 
of identification and desire in the Oedipus complex and the family.  The “little boy” in 
Freud’s narrative “takes his father as his ideal.”  He seeks to act in the way that his father 
acts and to desire what his father desires.  Patterning himself on the father, the “little boy” 
also desires (sexual) possession of his mother.  This results in “two psychologically 
distinct ties: a straightforward sexual object-cathexis towards his mother and a typical 
identification towards his father.” Thus, Freud maintains a distinction between desire and 
identification, between “what one would like to be” and what “one would like to 
have” (Freud Group 60-62).  
For Freud, “identification is the original form of emotional tie with an 
object” (Group 65).  Identification, the desire to be another, precedes the desire for 
another.  More specifically, Freud argues that the identification with the father “is a direct 
and immediate identification and takes place earlier than any object-cathexis” (Reader 
639).  All too often, however, desire for an object “regresses” to identification.  When the 
8 In this context “before” and “prior to” should not be read as referring unproblematically to 
temporal coordinates.  In the same way that every reference to the “pre-Symbolic Real” is always 
made from within the Symbolic Order, every reference to a “subject before subjection” is a 
retroactive (re)construction of a mythic, inaugural scene.  The positing of such a scene, awkward 
as it may be, is necessary if one is to account for the gap between the social subject’s symbolic 
identifications and that which cannot be symbolized by the socio-symbolic order.54
relation to the loved object is blocked, the subject tries to take on those traits that it loved 
in the lost object or to occupy its position.  
This provides one of the links in the logical chain through which Freud analyzes 
Dora’s hysterical coughing.  Dora, the subject of one of psychoanalysis’ best known case 
studies, is a young girl from a wealthy family who is passionately attached to her father.  
By means of an extended interpretation that we will not attempt to summarize here, Freud 
concludes that Dora’s fits of coughing actually derive from her jealousy of a woman 
(Frau K.) that she believes performs oral sex on her father.  Dora’s symptom is derived 
from the fact that her father receives sexual gratification from Frau K’s throat.  Her cough 
represents an identification with Frau K, one that compensates for the fact that this 
woman (rather than Dora herself) has become the object of the father’s affections.  
According to Freud, Dora sustains her erotic attachment to her father by imagining 
herself in the position of the woman pleasuring him.  An identification, then, may be built 
upon “a jealous rivalry.”  Freud explains, “a rival that cannot be overcome may be 
integrated into the subject’s personality through an identification (Reader 644).9 
This detour through Dora’s case demonstrates that identification is “ambivalent 
from the very first; it can turn into an expression of tenderness as easily as into a wish for 
someone’s removal” (Group 61). Dora may feel strongly attached to Frau K. as the kind 
of woman desired by her father, yet she may also jealously desire to usurp her.  Similarly, 
the little boy may admire and imitate his father, while simultaneously nurturing a desire 
9 This is the example of identification in relation to the neurotic symptom suggested by Freud in 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.55
to eliminate and replace him.  The psychoanalytic shibboleth of the Oedipus complex is 
itself founded upon an ambivalent identification with the father that supports both a 
desire for the mother and, later, a desire for the father’s removal.  As Freud says 
elsewhere, the boy’s “identification with his father then takes on a hostile colouring and 
changes into a wish to get rid of his father in order to take his place with his mother . . . it 
seems as if the ambivalence inherent in the identification from the beginning had become 
manifest” (Reader 640).
Freud also links identification with the formation of the ego.  In psychoanalysis, 
the ego is associated with perception and conscious subjectivity: “it is to the ego that 
consciousness is attached” (Reader 630).  It is well known that in Freud’s theory the ego 
and the conscious processes associated with it make up only a small part of the subject: 
“at any given moment conscious includes only a small content, so that the greater part of 
what we call conscious knowledge must in any case be for very considerable periods of 
time in a state of latency, that is to say, of being psychically unconscious” (Reader 574).  
The ego does not merely fail to recognize unconscious thoughts and feelings, but actively 
prevents these from emerging into consciousness.  The Freudian subject, then, is split 
along an axis that divides the ego from the content that it represses from consciousness.  
The psychic life of the subject is structured around “the antithesis between the coherent 
ego and the repressed which is split off from it” (Reader 631).
In The Ego and the Id, Freud explains that the ego is founded and maintained 
through identifications.  When an object of erotic desire is blocked or otherwise becomes 
a source of disappointment for the subject, desire may be displaced onto some other 56
object.  Alternately, the subject may identify with the lost object and “set [it] up again 
inside the ego” (Reader 638).  The ego seeks to reconstruct itself in the image of the love-
object, as if to say to the desiring subject: “’Look, you can love me too-I am so like the 
object’” (Reader 638).  The ego, then, is constituted as “a precipitate of abandoned 
object-cathexes,” an entity that takes its structure from the contingent “history of those 
object-choices” (Reader 638).  Although the ego provides the subject with a coherent 
representation of itself, it is actually made up of a series of heterogeneous, and often 
conflicting, identifications.   As Diana Fuss explains, “what Freudian psychoanalysis 
understands by ‘subjectivity’ is precisely this struggle to negotiate a constantly changing 
field of ambivalent identifications; indeed, subjectivity can be most concisely understood 
as the history of one’s identifications” (34). 
  The Freudian notion of identification, as we have outlined it here, can provide the 
basis for theorizing an unstable, desiring political subject.  Yet, as Fuss cautions, Freudian 
identification “carries with it a host of theoretical problems, ideological incoherencies, 
and conceptual difficulties” (11).  Before providing an explanation of the role played by 
identification in the formation of socio-political subjects, it will first be necessary to 
speak to some of these difficulties.  Principle among them is the strict opposition that 
Freudian theory maintains between identification and desire, the desire to be the other 
and the desire for the other.  As Fuss points out, “to desire and to identify with the same 
person at the same time is, in this model, a theoretical impossibility” (Fuss 11).  In their 
heterodox appropriations of identification, feminists, queer theorists, and others have 
thoroughly undermined this distinction.57
  Fuss is not alone in arguing that the boundary between identification and desire 
serves the function of disavowing same-sex desire: “if two people of the same sex desire 
one another, it is because one of the two has cross-identified with the opposite sex” (12).  
In other words, to desire someone of the same sex first requires a “regression” from 
heterosexual desire to identification. Consequently, “for Freud, the story of homosexual 
desire is always a displaced form of heterosexuality” (Fuss 12).  Lesbian desire, for 
example, is understood as the result of a masculine identification that then mimics a 
“normal” desire for other women. The assumption of a normative heterosexuality cannot, 
finally, provide grounds for a legitimate epistemological distinction between desire and 
identification.  Even in Freud’s own texts, the relationship between desire and 
identification is far more complex than an opposition between separate processes will 
allow.  In Mourning and Melancholia, for example, Freud describes identification as “a 
preliminary stage of object-choice, that is the first way . . .that the ego picks out an 
object” (Reader 587).  Despite Freud’s attempt to separate them, desire and identification 
interpenetrate each other and the boundaries between them remain fluid and 
indeterminate.
  Judith Butler makes precisely this point in her discussion of identification in 
Bodies That Matter: “to identify is not to oppose desire” (100).  Butler suggests, instead, 
that identification is the site at which desire is negotiated.  The identifications with 
socially available images and signifiers that found the subject are themselves expressions 
of desire: “the subject pursues subordination as the promise of existence . . .[and] 
subjection exploits the desire for existence, where existence is always conferred from 58
elsewhere” (PLP 21).  The inauguration of the subject through identification with and 
subordination to the social order requires a logically “prior desire for social existence, a 
desire exploited by regulatory power” (PLP 19).
Butler’s work also introduces the valuable category of  “disavowed 
identifications,” identifications that protect the subject from socially prohibited desires. 
Because it involves an ambivalent relationship to its object, identification may facilitate a 
desire or, alternately, defend against it.  Marking a decisive break from psychoanalytic 
orthodoxy, Butler maintains that  “sexed positions are . . . secured through the repudiation 
and abjection of homosexuality and the assumption of a normative 
heterosexuality” (BTM 111).  The maintenance of a relatively consistent identification 
with a normative gendered subject position, then, requires the disavowal of those 
identifications that may disrupt normative heterosexuality.  Though renounced, these 
disidentifications (with queers, butches, queens, and others) are still identifications: “a 
radical refusal to identify with a given position suggests that on some level an 
identification has already taken place, an identification that is made and 
disavowed” (BTM 113).  The formation of the normative heterosexual subject requires 
not only a rejection of the desire to be some “other” gender, but also the desire for a 
person with a gender like one’s own: “The formula ‘I have never loved’ someone of a 
similar gender and ‘I have never lost’ any such person predicates the ‘I’ on the ‘never-
never’ of that love and loss” (PLP 23).
Thus, Butler suggests that identification with a normative gendered position not 
only presupposes heterosexual desire as its support, but also requires a disavowed 59
identification with non-normative gender and a foreclosure of same-sex desire.  In 
Butler’s formulations, we encounter the inadequacy of the Freudian division between 
identification and desire as well as the need to account for identifications that have been 
disavowed.  Finally, Butler cautions that the illusion of coherent identities requires this 
double structure of repudiation (of what has been recognized and rejected) and 
foreclosure (of what has been repressed before even becoming conscious).  Those 
identities that have the greatest power to elicit the subject’s desire for unity and 
consistency do so “through the production, exclusion, and repudiation of abjected” 
subject position (BTM 113). Although normative gender positions present the most 
obvious example of coherency at the cost of exclusion, the politics of the normalized gay 
movement (“no sex please, we’re gay”) follows a similar pattern.10 
Fuss and Butler’s reformulations of the relation between desire and identification 
help to resolve a major dilemma within Freud’s theory.  Freud’s assumption of the 
nuclear family as the primary site of subject-formation and of the father as the earliest 
identification have also been thoroughly critiqued.  It is, however, beyond the scope of 
the present study to engage with the rich literature charting the encounter between 
feminism and psychoanalysis out of which many of these analyses emerge.  
The work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari also provides a fascinating critique 
of Oedipalization (and the primary identification upon which it is, supposedly, founded) 
by arguing that the nuclear family is a uniquely capitalist social formation and that desire 
10 See Michael Warner’s The Trouble With Normal for an analysis of the normalized gay 
movement and what he refers to as “the politics of shame.”60
and subjectivity must be thought in terms of the syncretic category “desiring-production.”  
Here again, an exploration of the richness (and eccentricity) of a text like The Anti-
Oedipus will lead us too far from the central concern of this chapter.  It will have to 
suffice, then, to point out that one need not accept the Oedipal narrative or the primacy of 
the nuclear family in the formation of the subject in order to appropriate Freud’s notion of 
identification for the purposes of political theory.  Further, Freud is not the only source 
for the theory of identification, as it is greatly refined in the work of Jacques Lacan.  His 
account of the formation of the ego is a productive re-working of Freud’s theory and, 
finally, shares more in common with our explicit concerns in this chapter: the 
impossibility of full identity, the subject’s alienated relationship to images and signifiers, 
and the Real of the subject that escapes discursive articulation.
3.3 Imaginary Identification and Alienation in the Symbolic
For Lacan, the ego comes about when the child first identifies with a reflected 
image of itself.  He goes on to suggest that this “mirror stage” should be understood “as 
an identification . . .the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes 
[. . .] an image” (Lacan Ecrits 4).  At the time of the mirror stage, the child is “an 
inchoate collection of desires,” a “fragmented body” characterized by “turbulent 
movements,” “confusion” and “disharmony” (Lacan III 39, 95, Ecrits 6).  As Fink 
explains, subjectivity at this stage amounts to little more than an “unorganized jumble of 
sensations and impulses” (Fink 37). The mirror image, however, appears to possess the 
unity and coordination that the child lacks.  The child is fascinated with the image offered 
by the mirror because it is unified and coherent in a way that he is not, yet he also hates 61
the image because it is an external and inaccessible object.  As Lacan explains, “in as 
much as he recognizes his unity in an object, he feels himself to be in disarray in relation 
to the latter” (II 169).
The child’s identification with the specular image operates through the register of 
experience that Lacan designates “the imaginary.”  The imaginary refers to the realm of 
images, whether “conscious or unconscious, perceived or imagined” (Sheridan 279).  As 
illustrated by the mirror stage, imaginary relations are characterized by tension and 
ambivalence:  “every imaginary relation comes about via a kind of you or me between the 
subject and the object [of imaginary identification].  That is to say—If it’s you, I’m not.  If 
it’s me, it’s you who isn’t” (Lacan II 169).  
Thus, imaginary relations are characterized by intense fluctuations between love 
and hate, a perpetual oscillation that can only find resolution in the symbolic order.  The 
ambivalence of imaginary relations is due to the fact that the subject seeks unity and self-
recognition from an external image that it can never fully integrate.  As Lacan explains, 
the subject “will never be completely unified precisely because this is brought about in an 
alienating way, in the form of a foreign image” (III 95).  The subject can never be self-
identical; a gap will always remain between it and the imaginary object.  Because it is 
founded upon such an ambivalent, alienating relation to an image, Lacan locates the ego 
in the realm of objects, rather than equating it with the subject: “the ego really is an 
object” (II 49). 
The experience of imaginary identification is not unique to infancy, for the adult 
ego that provides the “mirage” of stable subjectivity is itself “an imaginary construction” 62
made up of  “a sum of identifications” (II 243, 209).  The jumble of conflicting 
identifications with socially available ideal images forms the basis of the adult ego.  As 
Fink puts it:
Once internalized, these various images fuse, in a manner of speaking, into 
a vast global image [. . .] it is this crystallization of images which allows 
for a coherent ‘sense of self’ [. . .] and a great deal of our attempt to ‘make 
sense’ of the world around us involves juxtaposing what we see and hear 
with this internalized self-image [. . .] (37)
For Lacan, the appearance of the ego as a coherent, unified, and stable identity is an 
illusion concealing and repressing the operations of the unconscious: “the ego is 
essentially an alter ego” (III 39).  When we refer to ourselves as “I,” (e.g., “I could never 
say/do something so horrible”), we are almost always referring to this synthesized and 
idealized version of ourselves.
Although the formation of the mirror stage and the ego are primarily functions of 
the imaginary, they are also supported by the symbolic.  Images are always “enmeshed in 
the symbolic order,” and “the imaginary experience is inscribed in the register of the 
symbolic as early as you can think it” (II 257).  The imaginary and the symbolic registers 
are distinct dimensions, yet they “criss-cross” and become “mixed up together” (II 105).  
Lacan also suggests “the symbolic relation is constituted . . . prior to the fixation of the 
self-image, prior to the structuring of the ego” (II 257).  To function, imaginary 
identifications require the support of signifying structures.  In the mirror stage, for 
example, the child will only internalize the reflected image if parents and others confirm
—likely through spoken language, “yes, that’s you!”—that he should seek to identify 
himself with this image.  Even before entering into the imaginary relation with its 63
reflection, the child has been assigned a name.  This name may reflect both the desires of 
the parents and a discursive structure of kinship (a given name and a family name).  
Before the child has formed an ego as an imaginary construct, he is already called upon 
to respond to the hail of his proper name, a signifier of the other’s desire and the hail of 
an alien system.
In Seminar XI, Lacan describes the subject’s entry into to the symbolic order as a 
“forced choice.”  No subject can occupy social reality without identifying with moments 
articulated by those discourses that constitute a given socio-symbolic order.  To assume a 
social identity and to gain self-recognition outside of psychosis, the subject must submit 
to representation by a signifier.  As we suggested, the most rudimentary example is the 
proper name, which signifies the subject to others.  To have one’s name erased from the 
symbolic is to be “rubbed out” of social reality, to die a social (if not necessarily a literal) 
death.  Although Lacan assigns to the imaginary the primary role in the construction of 
the ego, he maintains that “that which is properly speaking the experience of the subject, 
that which causes the subject to exist, is to be located at the level of the emergence of the 
symbolic” (XI 219).  To truly come into existence, the subject must submit to the forced 
choice of symbolic alienation.  Thus, Lacan states that it is “alienation . . . [that] 
constitutes the subject as such” (“Position” 268).
In order to illustrate the compulsory nature of this “choice,” Lacan compares it to 
a mugger that presents his victim with two unequal options: “your money or your life.”  
To choose from among these options is to have no choice at all, for “if I choose the 
money, I lose both.” (Lacan XI 212).  Clearly, one must choose to give up one’s money if 64
one wishes to survive the encounter with the mugger.  The choice is “forced” because to 
choose the other option is to lose both one’s life and one’s money (which the mugger will 
surely take away once he has carried out his threat).  Still, the choice to give up one’s 
money does not present an agreeable solution to the problem either, for “if I choose life, I 
have life without the money, a life deprived of something” (Lacan XI 212).
The subject’s entry into discourse and the symbolic order has the same character 
as the encounter with the mugger, but with much higher stakes.  The Other demands that 
the subject choose between meaningful existence and unmediated access to its being: “the 
subject cannot be wholly represented in the Other: there is always a remainder” (Laurent 
25).  The discursive formations available to the subject within a given social reality can 
never completely symbolize her being.  Yet, to have meaning and identity of any kind, the 
subject must rely upon discursive-symbolic structures.  Consequently, as subjects, we are 
compelled to make a forced choice: “if we choose being, the subject disappears, it eludes 
us, it falls into non-meaning.  If we choose meaning, the meaning survives only deprived 
of that part of non-meaning that is, strictly speaking, that which constitutes in the 
realization of the subject” (Lacan XI 211).  Just as one must give up something valuable 
in order to escape death at the hands of a mugger, the subject must agree to live a life 
“deprived of something” in order to gain a symbolic identity.
This “something” is jouissance, the subject’s living being.  In Lacan’s teachings 
jouissance, or enjoyment, undergoes a number of transformations.  Any presentation of it 
is necessarily incomplete and involves an act of synthesis and interpretation.  Here we are 
concerned with what Dylan Evans terms “jouissance of the body,” that remainder of 65
being which is in excess of the symbolic order’s ability to symbolize and make use of.  
Thus, in his seminar entitled Encore, Lacan states that “being is the jouissance of the 
body as such” and that it can be defined as that which “serves no purpose” in the 
symbolic (XX 6, 3).  Lacan also identifies the body as an “enjoying substance” (XX 23).  
The notion of substance advanced here does not, however, refer to an essential 
materiality, but rather to “the substance of the body . . . defined only as that which enjoys 
itself” (XX 23).
In this context, enjoyment can be linked with the concepts of the libido and the 
drives (Evans 11, Soler 52).  Following Freud, Lacan associates the libido with 
instinctual energy or “pure life instinct” free of any aim to preserve or to destroy itself 
(XI 196).  He also suggests that the Freudian drives correspond to “the drift of 
jouissance” (XX 112).  Drives are established early in a child’s development, when the 
instinctual energy of the living body becomes channeled and territorialized.  As the child 
is cared for, sites of pleasure are inscribed upon its body, which define its erotic zones. 
Libido is thereby directed and the child’s incoherent energies are converted into a set of 
drives (oral, anal, etc.), which are then culturally regulated.  Some parts of the body 
become sites of pleasure (in Lacan’s earlier writings jouissance is associated with 
pleasurable sensations, especially orgasm), while others are effectively rendered dead to 
enjoyment.  The result of this process of territorialization, the drives represent closed 
circuits of libidinal energy that become fixated on particular objects.  In its pursuit of its 
drives, the subject is actually seeking its lost enjoyment or, as Marie Jaanus puts it: “at 
stake in the drive are lost, objective fragments of our own body” (124).66
The subordination to a signifier demanded by the vel of alienation forces the 
subject to give up any unmediated relationship to enjoyment and the drives: “at the very 
moment at which the subject identifies with such a signifier, he is petrified.  He is defined 
as if he were dead, or as if he were lacking the living part of his being that contains his 
jouissance” (Laurent 25). Thus, the subject’s entry into discourse involves a fossilization 
of the libido, a draining away of enjoyment (Evan 13).  The subject’s being-enjoyment 
occupies the position of the pre-symbolic Real in relation to the symbolic order, “the 
subject cannot be wholly represented in the Other: there is always a remainder” (Laurent 
25).  
Synonymous with the pre-symbolic dimension of the Real discussed in the 
previous chapter, the scraps of enjoyment left to the alienated subject persist as the 
ineradicable residue of symbolization.  Still, we can only learn of this enjoyment-before-
alienation after the fact and through the symbolic: “the letter kills, but we learn this from 
the letter itself” (Lacan “Position” 275). As we have seen, the subject comes into 
existence through the forced choice of identification with a failed structural totality.  Yet, 
functioning as the pre-symbolic Real, the subject of enjoyment also acts as the indelible 
kernel that prevents the totalization of the structure.
To conclude our discussion of alienation, we offer a schema by Jacques-Alain 
Miller as a kind of visual summary of the process:
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Figure 3.1: Schema of alienation
The ($) represents the subject (S)11 crossed by a bar ( | ).  This bar marks the 
otherness within the subject: the split between the subject of enjoyment and the 
representation of the subject in the Other.  The split subject ($) is here placed in relation 
to the symbolic order, or the Other (S1S2).  The Other consists of a master signifier (S1) 
that fixes the signification of a number of other, secondary signifiers (S2).  As we have 
already discussed, master signifiers (nodal points-points de caption-quilting points) are 
empty in themselves, but act to establish discourses by setting the boundaries for the free 
play of other signifying elements (Laurent 30).
Alienation describes the process by which the subject seeks a stable identity 
through identification with a signifier that represents it in the social field.  This process 
should not be understood as a single moment in the development of the subject, but rather 
as a model for the relationship between the subject and the social signifiers made 
available by discursive articulations.  The promise of a unified identity remains 
unfulfilled, however, because of the alienating character of the Other.  As Stavrakakis 
explains, “the subject of the signifier, the subject constituted on the basis of the 
acceptance of the laws of language, in uncovered as the subject of lack par 
excellence” (20).  The impossibility of a stable symbolic identity is due also, of course, to 
the promiscuity of the signifier, its tendency to metonymic sliding and metaphoric 
11 Pronounced the same way as “Es,” Freud’s id. 68
substitution.  Asserting once again the primacy of the signifier over the signified, Lacan 
maintains in “The Position of the Unconscious” that the division of the subject “derives 
from nothing other than that very same play, the play of signifiers—signifiers, not 
signs” (267).
The subject’s quest for a stable identity, however, need not end with alienation.  
The subject may, in fact, realize that the stability it seeks through identification with a 
signifier is, finally, impossible.  Lacanian theory uses the term separation to designate the 
process by which the subject recognizes the failure of the symbolic order to provide a 
stable and coherent identity.  Separation occurs at the moment that the Other “shows 
some sign of incompleteness, fallibility, or deficiency” for the subject (Fink 53).  Once 
the subject recognizes that both it and the symbolic order are barred (lacking and 
incomplete), she begins to desire some way out of the predicament.  As Colette Soler 
suggests, “separation supposes a want to get out, a want to know what one is beyond 
what the Other can say, beyond what is inscribed in the Other” (49).  Desire (a desire to 
escape alienation, to “get out”) is central to the structure of separation.
 
A second of J.-A. Millers’ schemas illustrates this process:69
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Figure 3.2: Schema of separation 
Here, the split subject ($) maintains an indirect relation to the symbolic order (S1S2), 
one that is mediated by some object of desire (a).  As with the Lacanian concept of 
enjoyment to which it is related, this “object little a” is multifaceted and may be defined 
in a number of ways depending upon the theoretical or clinical context in which it is 
being discussed.  For the moment, we will rely here on Stavrakakis’ explanation.  
Because the symbolic also lacks, it cannot “provide us with a solution for our [own] 
division, an exit from this frustrating state” (Stavrakakis 45).  In an attempt to resolve this 
dilemma, the subject fantasizes an object that conceals the lack in the subject and the 
symbolic order (Stavrakakis 45). 
A childless young man may imagine, for example, that a successful child will be 
capable of redeeming the father’s failures and lost opportunities.  Thus, the would-be 
father constitutes this unborn child as an object of desire that allows him to disavow his 
own failures and to maintain an ideal image of himself—“it’s too late for my dreams, but 
I can still see them come true through my son.”  The same young man, having lived a 
different life in which he reluctantly accepted the responsibility for an unplanned child 
may construct this child as the singular obstacle to his own self-fulfillment—“if it 
weren’t for my son, I could make something of myself.”  In both of these examples, the 
subject imagines that the presence or the absence of something quite ordinary (a child) 70
holds the magical power to grant him wholeness and completeness.  We will have more 
to say about the object a in our discussion of cynical identification and ideological 
fantasy in the next chapter.
  The constitution of every political identity takes place through the identification 
of the lacking subject with socially available images and signifiers.  Yet, the subject’s 
quest for a stable and coherent identity in the collective imaginary and the socio-symbolic 
order is doomed to failure.  The subject can never impose a final suture between his being 
and the images and signifiers that he assumes.  “What belongs to the socio-symbolic 
Other,” Stavrakakis cautions, “can never become totally ours; it can never become us: it 
will always be a source of ambivalence and alienation and this gap can never be 
bridged” (34).  The impossibility of closing this gap means that the promise of full 
identity is never realized and that the process of identification can never come to an end.  
It is precisely the failure of this process that triggers new acts of identification (Laclau 
and Zac 33).
  The importance of this account of identification and the lacking subject to 
political analysis is not simply to explain the relationship of the individual to society and 
politics (Stavrakakis 36).  One should avoid the temptation of misrecognizing the split 
subject as providing a model of “the individual psyche,” the subjective complement to 
“objective” social relations.  The subject cannot achieve the status of an “autonomous 
individual” any more than the social order can constitute itself as “society.” If we are to 
retain discourse theory’s insights into the impossibility of the social order, then a theory 
of the subject cannot simply act as the supplement that fills this lack in the “objective” 71
level.  As Stavrakakis points out, “one lack is no lack at all” (41).  In order to truly break 
from essential or totalizing conceptions of society and the social agent it is necessary to 
take into account both of these lacks—the lack in the subject and the lack in the 
Other” (41).
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CHAPTER 4
HOW DOES IDEOLOGY MASK IMPOSSIBILITY?
4.1 The End of Ideology?
  The constitutive incompleteness of the social discloses the always-present 
potential for structural transformation and subjective agency.  A social order does not 
constitute itself as a stable totality governed by internal principles, but is established by 
contingent decisions that partially fix the social field. The subject is equally the site of a 
decision, exercising agency through practices of identification and articulation. The space 
of subjective agency always remains open because the determining power of every 
discursive formation is limited by its failure to fully constitute itself (Laclau New 44).  
The recognition of the possibility of agency and social change may be blocked, however, 
by discourses that reify the social order and collective fantasies that screen social 
antagonisms.  
In order for the social theory presented in these pages to contribute to a project of 
emancipatory social transformation, it must be linked to a discourse of social critique that 
exposes the operation of ideological discourses and collective fantasies.  By calling 
attention to the structural failures and social antagonisms that these conceal, a socio-
symbolic critique could identify opportunities for new articulations.  Such a discourse 
would also respond to the present need for a new mode of social critique brought about 74
by the epistemological crisis in the Marxist theory of ideology and by the need to explain 
the cynical social practices that characterizes the aftermath of the Cold War.
In contemporary critical discourse, the term “ideology” has approached the state 
of an empty signifier, divested of specific content, and linked in a chain of equivalence to 
“false representation,” “distortion,” and so forth.  This evacuation of the specificity of the 
theory of ideology through an extension of a chain of equivalence is linked to the 
progressive erosion of any terrain that might be sensibly regarded as extra-ideological. 
The critical operations enabled by the classical theory of ideology require the availability 
of just such a terrain, a position outside of ideology from which to critique its 
mystifications.  
Yet, if this position can no longer be secured by the usual methods (invocations of 
the scientific or metalinguistic status of critical discourse or the supposedly objective 
character of its descriptions), then the entire project of ideology critique is threatened. 
As a response to this crisis, the semantic and structural borders of “the ideological” have 
expanded to encircle a vast terrain.  In “The Death and Resurrection of the Theory of 
Ideology,” Ernesto Laclau concurs with Slavoj Zizek that ideology may have finally 
succumbed to the centrifugal force of its own expansion: “at some stage the frontier 
dividing the ideological from the non-ideological is blurred and, as a result, there is an 
inflation of the concept of ideology which loses, in that way, all analytical 
precision” (297).  
The relevance of the category of ideology is not threatened because it 
encompasses too little of the present theoretical terrain, but precisely because it 75
encompasses too much.  If any reference to an “outside-text” or a metalanguage must be 
foreclosed, then it seems impossible any longer to refer to any reality or structural 
position that is anterior to or independent of the ideological.  Ideology, a category 
originally intended to describe a relationship of distortion between objective reality and 
social consciousness, seems to have lost its ability to fulfill this function.  As Laclau 
explains, ideology disintegrates as an analytic category to the extent that “it begins to 
embrace everything, including the very neutral, extra-ideological ground supposed to 
provide the standard by means of which one can measure ideological distortion” (“Death” 
298).  
The need for a new mode of social critique cannot, however, be attributed solely 
to the declining value of ideology as a signifier of a specific theoretical terrain.  In the 
aftermath of the Cold War, the unchecked global expansion of Western consumer culture 
makes an analysis of cynical social practice a necessary and urgent project.  According to 
Zizek, the opposed camps of Cold War antagonism represented “two modes of cynical 
ideology: ‘consumerist’, post-Protestant, late-capitalist cynicism, and the cynicism that 
pertained to the late ‘real Socialism.’”  In the latter case, one was called upon to perform 
the empty forms of belief under the threat of totalitarian violence.  In the former, society 
is supposedly structured around free argumentation and the consent of the governed, yet 
one is conscious that the near-monopoly control of mass media production by a small 
number of private corporations severely limits the constitution of anything remotely 
approaching the ideal of a public sphere (Zizek “Spectre” 18). 76
In The Sublime Object of Ideology, Zizek urges us to extend social critique 
beyond attempts to reveal the falseness of ideological truths.  He openly wonders if  “this 
concept of ideology as a naïve consciousness still appl[ies] to today’s world” (Zizek SO 
29).  Zizek seems, at times, inclined to dismiss such a concept in our present context in 
which the primary operation of ideology is cynical: “the subject is quite aware of the 
distance between the ideological mask and the social reality, but he none the less still 
insists upon the mask” (SO 29).  However, in a period marked by the pervasiveness of 
naïve attachments to conservative, nationalist, and neo-imperialist ideologies in the 
United States—precisely the site where one might expect to find universal late capitalist 
cynicism—it is clear that the classical mode of ideological critique needs to be 
reformulated rather than simply discarded.  There remains a persisting need to explain 
those identifications with ideology that are structured by “naïve” belief or the acceptance 
of doctrinal authority.  
In order to understand the present dissipation of the category of ideology and to 
point towards the possibility of its “resurrection,” it is useful to examine several of 
Marx’s statements regarding social topology and class consciousness that have 
contributed to the present difficulties.  The development of the theory of ideology has, in 
many cases, suffered from problems already present in these classical formulations.  
Although they are often combined in a given analysis, classical Marxism maintains two 
conceptually distinct approaches to ideology (Laclau New 89, Torfing 113).  
According to the first approach, ideology is understood as a level within a social 
topology.  In his Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, for example, Marx 77
describes society as a structural totality, consisting of two discrete levels, the economic 
structure and the superstructure: “The totality of these relations of production constitutes 
the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and 
political superstructure and to which corresponds definite forms of social 
consciousness” (Marx 211).  As the foundation of the totality “society,” the economic 
base (the social relations by which the material conditions for human existence are 
produced and reproduced within a given mode of production) determines the 
superstructure (non-economic social formations which can be explained through 
reference to the base) (Elster 172).  Within this model, ideology (along with politics) is 
identified as a superstructural level within the social totality (Laclau “Death” 321).
  According to the second approach, ideology is understood as false consciousness.  
This is the sense we find in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, which explains 
the rise to power of Napoleon’s bungling nephew in terms of a struggle between rival 
classes.  Before turning to contemporary events, Marx and Engels briefly consider the 
symbolism of the French Revolution.  Regarding the revolution as a struggle for the 
establishment of “modern bourgeois society,” they comment upon the use of classical 
imagery by the bourgeoisie to represent their particular struggle as one of universal 
human emancipation: “And in the classically austere traditions of the Roman Republic its 
gladiators found the ideals and the art forms, the self-deceptions that they needed in order 
to conceal from themselves the bourgeois limitations of the content of their struggles and 
to maintain their passion on the high plane of great history. . . “ (189).  Thus, the 78
bourgeoisie maintained a false image of itself, that of a universal class capable of 
representing the interests of society in general.  
In The German Ideology, Marx argues that such a distortion is a necessary 
element in class struggle: “every class striving to gain control . . . must first win political 
power in order to represent its interests in turn as the universal interest, something which 
that class is forced to do immediately” (Marx 120).  Self-deception, however, is hardly a 
sufficient condition for securing control over the governed.  If hegemony is to be 
maintained, those ruled must misrecognize their own interests, identifying these with the 
interests of the ruling class:  “The class having the means of material production has also 
control over the means of intellectual production, so that it also controls, generally 
speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of intellectual production” (Marx 129).  
In the hands of a ruling class, consciousness and thought become instruments of 
distortion and domination.  The particular interests of the ruling class are falsely 
presented as if they were universal and the ruled class, lacking the ability to recognize its 
own interests, is deceived.  In both cases there is a misrecognition, a failure of 
representation to properly mediate between consciousness (the subject) and material 
reality (the object) (Hawkes 14).
Clearly, a reformulation of the theory of ideology that builds upon an 
understanding of the social field as a constitutively incomplete socio-symbolic order must 
break decisively from the first approach.  Theories of ideology that identify it with a 
distinct level within a social topology often rely upon an essentialist conception of the 
social, whether in the form of economism or structural totalization.  In analyses that rely 79
upon the base-superstructure metaphor, there is a strong temptation to assign to the 
economic base the place of a fixed center that determines the form and function of the 
ideological level.  Even when the relationship between ideology and economy is not 
defined in terms of direct determination, a topological model may still conceive of the 
economy as an autonomous object or a priori category, a pre-given positivity with no 
conditions of emergence other than its own abstract logic.  Marxist theory has offered a 
number of corrections to these problems: asserting the relative autonomy of the 
superstructure and its reciprocal action on the base, for example, or bracketing the base-
superstructure metaphor altogether (as Althusser does).  There is no place, however, in 
our present theoretical framework for any conception of ideology as a level within the 
internal composition of a unified structure or objective totality.  
A revised theory of ideology that would be consistent with the model presented in 
this study must emerge, instead, from the conceptual problems surrounding the categories 
of distortion and misrepresentation (Laclau “Death” 299).  Again, our approach will part 
ways with the classical formulation.  Within Marxist thought, the false consciousness 
approach to ideology usually assumes that social agents are constituted first and foremost 
as class subjects, and that ideology offers them a distorted representation of their true 
interests.  It is claimed that these interests are derived from the subjects’ shared structural 
position within material relations of production.  Laclau argues, however, that this 
approach results in a flawed conception the subject and social agency: “the notion of false 
consciousness only makes sense if the identity of the social agent can be fixed” (Laclau 
New 92).  If, as we have been arguing, structural relations and social identities can never 80
fully constitute themselves, then the identity of the social agent can never be fixed in this 
way.  This is not to say that social agents may not be constituted as class subjects, but 
only that this will be the result of a contingent articulation rather than the expression a 
structural necessity.
A theory of ideology that too closely ties distortion to the misrepresentation of 
class interests also runs the risk of reducing social antagonism and political identities to a 
pair of opposed positions within a closed structure.  Laclau and Mouffe explain that, 
although a given social field may be divided into “two antagonistic camps” by the 
dominance of a single chain of equivalence, such a division is a contingent articulation 
and must not be taken as “an original and immutable datum” (151).  Further, a 
description of our present political scene in terms of an antagonistic struggle between 
opposed classes fails to grasp its complexity.  Contemporary social movements 
articulated in terms of environmentalism, anti-racism, global justice, and queer politics, 
for example, can’t be reduced to an essential (or displaced) class character without 
considerable conceptual violence.  
However, the failure of the class reductionist approach to offer a convincing 
account of social antagonism cannot be explained simply in terms of the historical 
emergence of greater social complexity.  Class struggle provided an insufficient 
explanation of Marx’s own time.  It required, from its inception, the support of secondary 
forms of explanation:
class opposition is incapable of dividing the totality of the social body into 
two antagonistic camps, of reproducing itself automatically as a line of 
demarcation in the political sphere.  It is for this reason that the 81
affirmation of the class struggle as the fundamental principle of political 
division always has to be explained by supplementary hypotheses which 
relegated its full applicability to the future: historical-sociological 
hypotheses—the simplification of the social structure, which would lead to 
the coincidence of real political struggles and struggles between the 
classes as agents constituted at the level of relations of production; 
hypotheses regarding the consciousness of the agents—the transition from 
the class in itself to the class for itself.  (Laclau and Mouffe 151-152)
The pressure to explain the present in terms of class opposition is relieved in this version 
of Marxist thought by the promise that, due to the unfolding of the laws of capitalism, 
classes will become increasingly polarized at some unspecified time in the future (the 
“historical-sociological hypotheses”). As Laclau has argued, however, it is not at all clear 
why a logical contradiction in a mode of production must necessarily result in a war 
between opposed classes as orthodox Marxism contends.12 
  The other hypotheses supporting the model of class struggle are those concerning 
the consciousness of class subjects.  When collectives of class subjects fail to recognize 
that they occupy identical positions in relation to the means of production, they remain 
merely a “class in itself.”  Thus, commenting on the French peasantry under Louis 
Bonaparte, Marx suggests that “insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among 
these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no 
national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class” (200). 
It is only when class subjects become aware of their shared interests that they 
become a “class for itself”: “insofar as a millions of families under economic conditions 
12 In the title essay of New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, Laclau argues that the distinction 
between contradiction and antagonism should be rigorously maintained.  A logical contradiction within a 
mode of production may or may not result in social antagonism: “the fact that it is impossible for an 
economic system to expand indefinitely does not necessarily mean that its collapse must take the form of a 
confrontation between groups [i.e., class struggle]” (6).82
of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of 
the other and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class” (Marx 200).  
This supplementary explanation purports to explain why class subjects fail to recognize 
their objective interests, and thus to account for why class struggle does not emerge as the 
primary antagonism of a given social order. 
This conception of false consciousness and class struggle is clearly incompatible 
with our notion of society and social agency.  A socio-symbolic approach to ideology 
cannot assume that political agency and social antagonism must take the form of a 
struggle between opposed classes.  We have argued, instead, that social agents are 
constituted through signifying practices that establish nodal points.  These nodal points 
partially fix the meaning of other signifiers, transforming elements in the field of 
discursivity into the moments of concrete discourses.  Through identification with these 
nodal points and discursive moments, subjects are constituted as social agents.  We have 
also provided an account of social antagonism as a force of negation that prevents the 
closure of society as a sutured totality, a concept very near to that of the Lacanian Real.  
Although it will not be disputed that social agents may be constituted through 
discursive practices that deploy the nodal point “class struggle,” it is not the case that 
these classes possess objective interests that can be derived from their position within 
relations of production.  The aims of social agents are, instead, the product of the 
articulation of collective wills.  As Laclau notes, even when a social agent is constituted 
as “the proletariat” or “the workers,” there is no guarantee that this agent will articulate 
its interests in terms of a struggle over ownership and control of the means of production: 83
unless we are confronted with a situation of extreme exploitation, the 
worker's attitude vis-à-vis capitalism will depend entirely on how his or 
her identity is constituted--as socialists knew a long time ago, when they 
were confronted by reformist tendencies in the trade-union movement. 
There is nothing in the workers demands which is intrinsically anti-
capitalist. (“Structure” 202-203) 
Following Laclau, we maintain a distinction between contradictions within production 
and class antagonism.  The former may take the form of “a contradiction without 
antagonism” while the latter may take the form of “an antagonism without 
contradiction” (“Structure” 202).  Laclau argues,  “it does not logically follow from the 
fact that the surplus-value is extracted from the worker that the latter will resist such 
extraction” (“Structure” 202).  Because the constitution of antagonistic social agents 
cannot be deduced from economic contradictions, the organization of the social order in 
terms of class struggle is not a historical or logical necessity.  Class struggle, then, is only 
one of the many forms that social antagonism and political agency may take.  If class 
struggle is a contingent form of social organization rather than the objective truth of the 
social order, then its necessary relation to the theory of ideology should be suspended. 
4.2 Towards A General Theory of Ideology
In this study we have argued that the social order should be understood as an 
undecidable, decentered structure that is persistently troubled by a failure of 
symbolization and by the ineradicable Real of social antagonism.  It also follows from the 
failure of every socio-symbolic order to constitute itself as a closed system of differences 
and the impossibility of fully symbolizing bodily enjoyment that self-transparent social 
identity can never be achieved.  In this new theoretical terrain we must set aside the 84
notion that ideology can be located as a level within a structural totality or characterized 
as a misrepresentation of class interests.  We should not understand the distortion of 
ideology as a false representation of objective social relations (e.g., relations of capitalist 
exploitation), but rather as the projection of the impossible closure, fullness, and self-
transparency of society or the subject onto some particular content.
  The concept of distortion normally assumes a primary meaning that is falsified in 
a way that can be made visible after the fact.  Without a fully constituted prior meaning, it 
seems that one can hardly talk of distortion.  Laclau proposes a solution to this difficulty 
that does not require reference to a prior objectivity or a transcendental meaning: “the 
original meaning is illusory and the distortive operation consists in precisely creating that 
illusion—that is, to project into something which is essentially divided the illusion of a 
fullness and self-transparency that it lacks” (“Death” 301).  Despite its necessity, primary 
meaning remains an impossible object.  Although the distortion constitutive of ideology 
requires a primary meaning to operate, the place of this meaning is a site of lack, not of 
fullness.  Laclau describes this projection in terms of incarnation, the attempt by a 
particular content to occupy the place of primary meaning.  The result is the double and 
interdependent distortion that characterizes ideological representation:
On the one hand closure as such, being an impossible operation, cannot 
have a content of its own and only shows itself through its projection in an 
object different from itself.  On the other hand this particular object, which 
at some point assumes the role of incarnating the closure of an ideological 
horizon, will be deformed as a result of that incarnating function.  
Between the particularity of the object which attempts to fulfill the 
operation of closure and this operation, there is a relation of mutual 
dependency in which each of the two poles is required, and at the same 
time, each partially limits the effects of the other. (Laclau “Death” 303)85
It is on the basis of this understanding of distortion that we may conceive of ideology as a 
denial of the constitutive lack of the socio-symbolic order and the subject through 
practices of identification.  Here we wish to extend Laclau’s formulation of the primary 
meaning that is distorted in ideology to the impossibility of stable identity, as well as the 
impossibility of society.  Because these lacks overlap, our position is already implicit in 
Laclau’s explanation.  
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to developing a theory of ideology 
consistent with the following general definition: ideology is the non-recognition or 
disavowal of the constitutive lack of the socio-symbolic order and the impossibility of 
self-transparent subjectivity through identificatory practices that take as their objects 
nodal points, signifiers, discursive positions (moments), images, and objects of desire that 
incarnate the closure of that order and/ or the promise of stable identity .  Despite its 
awkwardness, this definition of ideology has the advantage of condensing the conclusions 
presented in the previous two chapters.  The “and/or” of this definition is especially 
clumsy, yet it is necessary to recognize that not every ideological identification 
interpellates subjects through the promise of a harmonious society.  Our most passionate 
attachments to ideological forms may seem to have little to do with a desire (conscious or 
unconscious) for social objectivity or a utopian social order.  In many cases, the promise 
of stable identity alone provides a sufficient enticement for the identificatory practices of 
desiring subjects.  The point we wish to make is that incarnations that do not directly 
promise the achievement of a harmonious society may nonetheless compel ideological 86
identification.  The discourses of corporate advertising, for example, seldom aspire to 
establish a utopian society.  They promise, however, that satisfaction, identity, and 
autonomy can be achieved through consumption and participation in the market. 
This conception of ideology has the advantage of addressing both of the concerns 
we raised at the start of this chapter: the crisis of the Marxist theory of ideology and the 
need to critique cynical social practice.  The definition of ideological distortion as the 
incarnation of an impossible fullness re-establishes a line of demarcation between the 
ideological and the extra-ideological.  It is no longer necessary to establish the distance 
between a discourse of social critique and an ideological one by elevating the former to 
the status of a metalanguage.  A discourse is ideological by virtue of covering over the 
lack in the socio-symbolic order and the subject; any discourse that does not fulfill this 
function is, by this definition, not an ideological discourse.  In this context, to assert the 
non-ideological character of a discourse is to make no special claims about its status; it 
says nothing about the discourse’s value, the veracity of its truth claims, or the nature of 
its relations to other discourses.
This conception of ideology also addresses the need to explain those ideological 
practices that do not rely upon conscious belief for their effect.  A socio-symbolic 
approach to ideological identification maintains a distinction between non-recognition 
and disavowal, between a naïve relation to concrete ideological elements (signifiers, 
images, positions) and a cynical one.  In the case of a naïve interpellation, the subject 
does not recognize that the object of its desire and identification cannot, in fact, provide it 
with a stable identity or ensure a harmonious society.  In a cynical identification, 87
however, the subject knows very well that the ideology in question is lacking  (to borrow 
a phrase that Zizek is fond of, the cynical subject knows that the emperor has no clothes).  
In this case, the cynical subject recognizes the failure of the ideology in question, yet 
engages in a fetishistic disavowal of this realization through an identification with some 
fascinating object of desire.  This objet petit a promises to patch up the holes in the Other, 
or at least, in its captivating presence, to act as a distraction.  Thus, ideological elements, 
operating individually or in assemblages, interpose themselves between the subject and a 
full recognition of social and subjective impossibility.
There remain several ancillary points that must be addressed before we discuss 
the differences between modes of ideological identification.  First, we wish to align our 
approach with Althusser’s thesis that “ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its 
practice, or practices” and that “this existence is material” (“Ideology” 125).  Ideology is 
not simply a false representation, a figment of consciousness, but rather comes into being 
through ritualized social practices.  Our claim for the material character of ideology 
follows directly from our accounts of discourse and articulation.  Because every material 
object possesses discursive conditions of emergence, there is no boundary of essence 
separating the discursive and the non-discursive.  As we argued in chapter two, material 
social formations are always discursive and discursive formations are always material.  
Discursive social formations are constituted, sustained, and transformed through 
collective practices that articulate linguistic and non-linguistic signifying elements.  
Drawing from Althusser once again, we insist that “the category of subject 88
[ . . .] is the constitutive category of all ideology” (“Ideology” 129).  Ideology is 
dependent upon the activity of subjects and is also responsible for their production: “all 
ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as 
subjects” (Althusser “Ideology” 129).  The constitution of the subject functions through 
interpellation, or “rituals of ideological recognition,” such as the introduction at a dinner 
party, the handshake with someone met in the street, or the policeman’s hail (Althusser 
“Ideology” 130).  Yet it should be clarified that ideologies do not simply exist in a state of 
latency, fully formed in the abstract space of thought, waiting to be activated by 
individual subjects.  
Judith Butler’s formulations of citation and performativity can help to clarify the 
way in which the apparent anteriority of ideology is actually (re)produced by the 
identificatory practices enacted by concrete subjects.  The force of ideological ritual 
depends upon the activity of subjects who attempt to approximate and cite its ideal form 
in their performances.  In the scenes of interpellation, subjects are compelled to play their 
parts as if they were citing a script, and are admonished if they “forget their lines” or take 
too many liberties with the (ideal) ideological text (Althusser’s “bad subjects”).  
Yet, the production of ideology as a set of self-evident social norms and identities 
is, already, the result of citation.  Ideology is constituted as an “anterior and 
inapproximable ideal [. . ] by the very citations it is said to command” (Butler BTM 14).  
An ideological practice does not exist “in a fixed form prior to its citation,” Butler 
explains, “but is produced through citation as that which exceeds the mortal 
approximation enacted by the subject” (Butler BTM 14).  Here we are reminded that 89
subjection is characterized by a recursive logic: the ideal forms of ideological rituals are 
produced as a surplus of the identificatory practices of subjects who are compelled to 
reiterate just these ideal forms.  Ideological distortion requires the manifold and diverse 
identificatory practices of subjects in relation to incarnations of closure.  In the following 
section, we hope to provide a description of the different modalities of ideological 
identification through a schematization of the split subject’s relation to nodal points, 
discursive moments, and objects of desire 
4.3 Ideological Identification: Obedience, Transference, and Cynicism
We will return here to the Lacanian schemas of alienation and separation 
(introduced in chapter 3) in order to outline three relations between the lacking subject 
and an incarnation of social or subjective closure. Two of these positions, obedience and 
transference, may be represented in terms of alienation ($ <> S1 and $ <> S1S2, 
respectively).  Ideological fantasy, however, must be mapped onto the schema for 
separation ($ <> a).  As with all schematizations, these represent a condensation of much 
more complex processes. These schemas also present ideological identification in terms 
of the subject’s relation to the socio-symbolic order and only describe identifications in 
the imaginary register to the extent that these are supported by the symbolic.  It is our 
hope, however, that these distinctions can serve as a heuristic for thinking about the 
manifold relationships between subjects and ideologies in terms that illuminate our 
general definition.  Before proceeding, we should also reiterate that when we speak of 
identification we do not maintain the Freudian distinction between identification and 
desire.  These practices may involve the desire-to-be, the desire for, or the desire-to-be-90
desired-by the object of identification in any number of possible combinations and 
arrangements.
  Nodal points that partially fix the meaning of secondary signifying elements 
structure ideological discourses.  The subject in a relationship of obedience to an 
ideological discourse submits unquestioningly to its authority without seeking after the 
reasons for why it should be obeyed.  A subject in an obedient relationship to a nationalist 
ideology, for example, earnestly enacts his passionate attachment to the nations’ master 
signifiers by pledging allegiance to its flag, singing its anthem, saluting its troops, and 
obeying its leaders.  He may even go so far as to sacrifice his civil rights or his own life 
in defense of the nodal points that provide him with the illusion of a stable identity as a 
“patriot” or “good citizen.”  His attachment to these nodal points may also be due to the 
fact that they present an idealized representation of the nation as if it were an objective 
fact.  In either case, the emptiness of the nodal points is misrecognized and they are 
invested with the power to suture the subject and the social order.  This form of 
identification is characterized by the subject’s obedience to the practices compelled by 
ideological discourse, without requiring any justification as to why it should be obeyed.
  In her discussion of Lacan’s Seminar XI, Soler explains that in alienation the 
subject is presented with two choices: “either to become petrified in a signifier or to slide 
into meaning” (48).  The obedient subject has become “petrified” through its 
unquestioning identification with the nodal points of an ideological discourse.  This 
relationship can be schematized as  $<>S1.  $ represents the split subject theorized in our 
third chapter and S1 stands in for the nodal point(s) that incarnates social and/or 91
subjective closure.  The obedient patriot questions neither the reasons offered for his 
loyalty, nor his own status as a “good citizen.”  Such a subject parallels exactly “what 
Lacan calls a subject petrified by the signifier [. . .] a subject that doesn’t ask any 
questions” (Soler 48).
  But what of the subject who, in alienation, chooses to “slide into meaning?” This 
subject maintains a transferential relationship to ideological discourse ($<>S1 S2). 
Zizek describes just this structure in The Sublime Object of Ideology: “transference names 
the vicious circle of belief: the reasons why we should believe are persuasive only to 
those who already believe” (38).  Although the ideological discourse is lacking and 
incomplete, the subject nonetheless regards it as the source of immanent, stable truth.  By 
acting as if this discourse was already “in the know,” the subject allows herself to be 
convinced that stable identity and closure can be achieved.  By seeking the truth 
contained within an ideology’s secondary signifiers, the subject has already submitted to 
its authority.  An intra-ideological critique (there is no position outside of ideology) of the 
subject’s identification will face considerable resistance, for facts contradicting the 
ideology inevitably become arguments in its favor.
  Zizek argues that such attachments ultimately serve to conceal the non-meaning 
of the master signifier that anchors the ideological discourse: 
[Ideology is] authority without truth. The necessary structural illusion 
which drives people to believe that truth can be found in laws describes 
precisely the mechanism of transference: transference is this supposition 
of a Truth, of a Meaning behind the stupid, traumatic, inconsistent fact of 
the Law (SO 38).92
Thus, a subject in a transferential relationship to a nationalist ideology denies the clumsy 
operation of authority, the traumatic non-meaning at the heart of the ideology.  She 
justifies his allegiance to the nation’s empty master signifiers through the secondary 
significations and systems of knowledge attached to these.  This subject salutes the troops 
because she believes them to be the guardians of her freedom, obeys the country’s leaders 
because they are democratically elected, and fights in the country’s wars because she 
believes these to be just.   
Finally, there is the subject of separation, the one who has seen through the 
ideology’s illusion of consistency and closure.  This supposed unmasking of the 
ideological illusion of “false consciousness” does not, however, free the subject from 
ideology, but rather places her in a new relationship to ideological discourse ($<>a).  The 
subject maintains a cynical distance from the discourse’s authority and truth claims, yet 
ideology continues to structure her everyday behavior.  Further, the barring of the 
ideological Other results in the retroactive production of a fascinating object (the 
Lacanian object a).  This object, in its dazzling presence, places itself in the site of lack 
that the subject shares with the symbolic order, offering itself either as the fetish that 
promises to suture society or as the singular obstacle to its achievement.
A subject participating in a nationalist ideological fantasy may act just as other 
subjects do—pledging allegiance to the flag, saluting the troops, fighting in the wars—
but without believing in any of the ideas associated with these activities.  Such a subject, 
having lost faith in the nation, may still wish for the nation to believe in itself, expressing 
this wish through the creation of some object a.  93
In Tarrying with the Negative, Zizek suggests that, with the fall of Communism, 
Eastern Europe has been constituted as such an object of desire for the West:  “the real 
object of fascination for the West is the gaze, namely the supposedly naïve gaze by means 
of which Eastern Europe stares back at the West, fascinated by its democracy” (“Enjoy” 
200).  Although the West seems to have lost its fervor for democratic governance—many 
of us in the U.S. no longer even bother to vote—Eastern Europe can be imagined as the 
site for the production of a fascinated and fascinating gaze, one that originates from “the 
point from which [the] West sees itself in a likable, idealized form, as worthy of 
love” (Zizek “Enjoy” 200).  Similarly, our cynical patriot may have long ago seen 
through the hypocrisy of the national rhetoric, yet he may perform his civic observances 
in order to enjoy the fantasy of a naïve gaze that looks upon him with love and 
admiration.  Such a subject will persist in his own hypocrisy, so long as he may retain this 
fantastic object and the enjoyment that it organizes
By mapping the subject’s identifications with ideological discourse onto J.A. 
Miller’s schemas for the Lacanian concepts of alienation and separation, we hope to have 
provided a preliminary framework for thinking about the relationships between subjects 
and ideological discourses.  A further study might examine the flexibility of subjects, 
their ability to move fluidly between these positions—someone who is largely cynical 
about the nation, for example, may be ready to submit in a period of nationalist 
expansion. 94
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
We will conclude this study by providing an illustration of the advantages of our 
model while also recognizing its limitations.  In the first section, “Artful Bigotry and 
Kitsch,” we offer a paradigmatic example of ideological fantasy through which we hope 
to demonstrate the relevance of a discourse theoretical-Lacanian approach to social 
critique.  In the section that follows, “Axiomatization and Dislocation,” we address one 
of the shortcomings of our model: its failure to specify capitalism as a theoretical object 
and to describe its impact upon the social field.
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5.1 Artful Bigotry and Kitsch: Irony, Racism, and Cynical Ideology
On April 18 of 2002, the Ohio-based fashion designers and retailers Abercrombie 
and Fitch withdrew a line of T-shirts featuring caricatures of Chinese Americans 
emblazoned with advertisements for fictional laundries and restaurants.  One of the shirts 
promoted the fictional “Wok-N-Bowl” where one could eat Chinese while throwing 
strikes.  Another offered the winking guarantee that at “Wong Brothers Laundry,” “two 
Wongs can make it white.”  Asian American activists were quick to attack these images 
as racial stereotypes and to demand that they be removed from the racks.  In an article for 
the online zine hardboiled, Kevin Lee asks: “Do they [Abercrombie and Fitch] see a mass 
of consumers so full of self-hate and self-loathing that they will latch onto any negative 
stereotype of themselves and parade it around town like a yellow minstrel?” (par.15).  
Lee’s remarks suggest that the practices organized around these shirts function 
primarily to represent and to maintain the misrepresentations of Asian Americans by a 
racist ideology.  Lee also argues that Abercrombie is hoping to capitalize on Asian 
American “self-hate” by marketing these shirts to consumers willing to identify with 
demeaning images that express a racist doctrine.  Lee’s interpretation takes its form from 
the classical critique of ideology, the unmasking of the illusion that distorts some primary 
content (here reality of Asian Americans). 
What such an analysis fails to account for is precisely the cynical operation of 
ideology at work in the practices of ironic consumption.  The participants in the design, 
marketing, retailing and consumption of the shirts do not necessarily misrecognize the 
caricatures of Asian Americans as the reality of actual Asian American people. The racist 96
ideology at work in these practices does not act through conscious belief and 
misrecognition of an objective reality.  It functions according to the structure of 
unconscious fantasy.
Writing for Poppolitics.com, cultural critic Mimi Nguyen points out that Kevin 
Lee’s response to the T-shirts, while an effective first step towards an ideological critique 
of the images, is ultimately insufficient:
The clothiers acknowledge these are not realistic images. To accuse the 
company of ‘misrepresenting’ Chinese or Asian men, culture, whatever, 
with negative stereotypes, is to forego the messier aspects of 
contemporary cultural politics. The standard criticism -- articulated during 
the controversy as a matter of ‘misleading [consumers] as to what Asian 
people are’ -- does not suffice. (par. 7)
As Nguyen points out, it is not enough to simply reveal that the shirts are expressions of a 
racist ideology that conceals the truth of “what Asian people are” in their supposedly pre-
ideological positivity (par. 7).  This model of analysis, while retaining a degree of 
rhetorical and strategic value, is finally insufficient when confronted with a set of social 
relations within which the participants (here the marketers, retailers, and consumers of 
the shirts) don’t believe in the truth of the ideology that they enact.  Their identification 
with racist images and signifiers is not direct, but rather mediated by some fascinating 
object.
As Zizek has pointed out, one of the strategic insufficiencies of the classical 
critique of ideology is that the response to it has already been prepared “in 
advance” (Zizek SO 30).  What better example of such a “response prepared in advance” 
than that of Abercrombie’s spin doctors:  “the public relations arm of Abercrombie 97
suggested that these t-shirts were meant to be funny. Ironic, right?” (Nguyen par. 12).  As 
Nguyen points out, however, “in this instance, irony is conservative in its operation,” 
offering as it does the fantasy of a society free from social antagonism (par. 12).  The 
inadequacy of the classical critique lies primarily in the fact that the marketers, retailers, 
and consumers of these shirts do not take ideological truth seriously—they already know 
very well that the racist stereotypes of Chinese Americans are a form of “false 
consciousness.”  
From the beginning, the shirts subvert a literal reading through their association 
with the Abercrombie and Fitch brand name.  Abercrombie & Fitch has associated its 
brand name with preppiness, provocation, and irony.  Acting as a nodal point, the brand 
name retroactively establishes the meaning of the racist stereotypes depicted on its shirts 
by “quilting” the ideological field—giving meaning to signifiers that do not have fixed 
significations.  The meaning of these signifiers (stereotypes of Chinese Americans) has 
long been established within a racist signifying chain, but as the “humorous” and “ironic” 
use of them shows, they remain available to other discourses. 
The master signifier “Abercrombie & Fitch” assigns new meanings to these 
elements within its own signifying chain.  They are now meant to connote humor, irony, 
and kitsch--meanings established and guaranteed by the “Name of the Brand.”  As 
Nguyen points out, “the reproduction of an image of a historical stereotype right now is 
not the reproduction of the meaning of the stereotype in its original social creation” (par. 
11).  At the same time that we acknowledge the operation of a brand discourse, we should 98
remain attentive to the fact that the shirts’ kitschy quality relies on a reference to racist 
ideology as such, even if just to laugh at it.  
We find that it is inadequate to accuse the marketers, retailers, or consumers of an 
error of knowledge.  The cynical subject has prepared a response to this critique in  
advance: “I don’t believe any of that racist nonsense, how could you be so naïve as to 
take me seriously?”  The classical notion of “false consciousness” is simply not operative 
here.  The cynical subject has never really assented to the truth claims of a racist 
ideology; she knows very well that these claims are an illusion.  The real “false 
consciousness” at work is the failure to recognize that the maintenance of ironic distance 
from ideological truth does not constitute freedom from ideology. 
Nguyen engages in this critique when she points out that the practices of 
marketing and consuming these images, while not making truth claims for a racist 
ideology, nonetheless pose a certain “as if”:
It implies that if a long enough view is taken, all histories, current events 
and individual dramas are insignificant in the “immensity of life.” The 
production of these caricatures is not a gesture to reinstate turn-of-the-
century Chinese exclusion, legal discrimination or even the emasculation 
of Chinese men, as much as it is a dismissal of these histories as 
meaningful in the present. (par. 12)
The marketing and consumption of these images, then, represses the Real trauma 
of racism that structures the socio-symbolic order of American society.  The Abercrombie 
images are not a simple repetition of the racist stereotypes of a hegemonic articulation, 
but rather a repression of the history of racism.  By acting as if this traumatic history is no 
longer relevant, the production and circulation of these T-shirts functions to maintain a 99
space of ideological fantasy. As we know, “the stake” of such fantasies is to deny the 
ineradicable antagonisms in society “that cannot be integrated” into its symbolization of 
itself (Zizek SO 126).
The practices organized around these Abercrombie and Fitch shirts clearly 
correspond to the schema of fantasy by which a split subject disavows the failure of the 
socio-symbolic order by maintaining an identification with an object of desire.  The 
subject denies the truth-value of the racist ideology, going so far as to act as if it were 
completely irrelevant to the present.  These practices suggest, contra Lee, that the racist 
ideology once directed against Chinese and Asian Americans no longer operates to negate 
the differential articulation of their identities.  By disavowing both the power such a racist 
ideology retains to negate identities and the continued impact of its former hegemony, 
these practices imagine a sutured social space in which such images would not have the 
power to offend anyone.  Thus, by reveling in the failure of a racist ideology to produce 
effects of truth and authority in the present, the subject is able to act as if he occupies a 
society free from the traumatic history of racism and the social antagonism it represents. 
We should also not fail to recognize that “there is always a certain enjoyment 
attached to ideological fantasy” (Torfing 117).  Concealing the failure of society to free 
itself from social antagonism by acting as if this has already occurred, “marks an eruption 
of enjoyment in the social field” (Torfing 117).  In this instance, the ironic enjoyment of 
the shirts requires a naïve gaze, situated in the past, that has an entirely different 
relationship to the racist ideology. There is no pleasure to be had from the fantasy 100
organized by shirts, no winking transgression, if one cannot imagine that the ideology 
they mock was not at one time believed by someone.  
Without the nostalgic enjoyment of this gaze, constituted as a Lacanian object a, 
the shirts lose their power to fascinate.  They become just another article of clothing on 
an Urban Outfitters rack or hanging in a preppie’s closet.  To function, the fantasy 
requires the imagined gaze of a subject in a relation of obedience or transference to racist 
ideology.  Further, this gaze must be exiled to the past so that it cannot threaten the 
contemporary closure of society that the practices presuppose.
5.2 Axiomatization and Dislocation
The project of the present study has been to formulate a social theory on the basis 
of insights drawn from postsructuralism and Lacanian psychoanalysis.  Although a socio-
symbolic approach manages to resolve some of the conceptual difficulties that have 
plagued other theories (especially structural Marxism), it also fails (in a sometimes 
spectacular way) to resolve others.  Rather than despair at this state of affairs, we may 
regard these shortcoming as an opportunity to further develop the model. As Laclau 
suggests, “if new ideas, new discourses, new social demands adapt badly to the ground 
they reoccupy it is this tension that must provide a starting point” (New 76).
It will be observed, perhaps, that one of the problems to which our model has  
“adapted badly” is the need to provide some account of contemporary capitalism.  A 
social theory that cannot in some way formulate capitalism as a theoretical object or at 
least describe its effects upon the social processes in which it is embedded will retain 
only a limited relevance and utility to present struggles for social justice and global 101
emancipation.  Adapting a discourse theoretical understanding of the social order to an 
analysis of capitalism is surely a necessary project, but one that is, unfortunately, beyond 
the scope of the present study. Here we will only gesture towards one possible approach 
to this problem by linking capitalism with a force of dislocation operating according to 
“axiomatization,” a dynamic social logic theorized by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari point to the uniqueness of capitalism as a 
material social logic that articulates the social order according to axioms. They suggest 
that all other forms of social organization rely upon a logic of difference in order to 
establish a dense network of social codes that maintain qualitative differences between 
objects, individuals, and types of labor.  Axiomatization, by contrast, establishes 
equivalences between discursively constructed objects and measures them in terms of 
quantities.  Axiomatization is the logic of commodification that makes an hour of labor 
exchangeable with a pound of sugar, subjecting them both to “money as [an] abstract 
universal equivalent” (Holland 67).  As Eugene Holland explains, axiomatization “defies 
and subverts” the codes by which a society establishes differences between “products,” 
“consumers,” and “labor-power” by applying the same “quantitative calculus” to all of 
them (66-67).  Deleuze and Guattari refer to this process of displacing material cultural 
codes as “decoding.”  They define capitalism in terms of “a social axiomatic that stands 
opposed to codes [differential articulations] in every respect” (Deleuze and Guattari 248). 
As with other equivalential social logics, axiomatization results in a subversion of 
differential meaning: “axiomatic social organization under capitalism [. . .] is quantitative 
and strictly meaningless” (Holland 67).  The identities of workers, for example, are 102
reduced to specified quanta of labor-power, and wealth is deterritorialized from any 
connection to discursively articulated material objects (property, machinery, and, in an 
age of electronic fund transfer, even paper money).  Although the operation of this 
quantitative calculus may provide the basis for new forms of social antagonism, it does 
not, by itself, provide the means for their discursive articulation.  
An equivalential logic of anti-colonial struggle, by contrast, subverts differential 
identities (race, gender, cultural difference) by re-articulating these elements in terms of a 
central antagonism between colonized and colonizer.  Clearly, the nodal points “native” 
and “imperial subject” can serve as signifiers of passionate identification.  However, 
barring a political terrain completely unfamiliar to us, “abstract quantum of labor-power” 
and “unit of liquid wealth” surely cannot.  Thus, unlike other logics of equivalence, 
axiomatization is not capable of establishing the discursive boundaries of the social field.  
Or, to put it in Deleuze and Guattari’s distinct theoretical language: “unlike previous 
social machines, the capitalist machine is incapable of providing a code that will apply to 
the whole of the social field” (33)
Axiomatization, then, acts on the social order primarily as a force of dislocation.  
That is, it destabilizes the partial fixation of relations between structural elements that 
establish a given socio-symbolic order.  This understanding of capitalism as first and 
foremost an equivalential, quantitative logic of disarticulation and decoding has the 
potential to provide the basis for a theoretical elaboration of Laclau’s observation that 
“there is something in contemporary capitalism which really tends to multiply 
dislocations and thus create a plurality of new antagonisms” (New 51).  In the same essay, 103
Laclau notes that “commodification is at the heart of the multiple dislocations of 
traditional social relations” (New 41).  Although it is productive of social antagonisms 
through the subversion of differential identity, axiomatization fails to provide a means for 
articulating these antagonisms.  Instead, axiomatization “tends toward a threshold” of 
absolute decoding (Deleuze and Guattari 33).  The limit of axiomatization is not the 
complete suturing of the social order (determination by the economy coupled with 
ideological hegemony), but rather its complete disintegration.   
Yet, the articulation of the social order is not simply replaced or overwhelmed by 
axiomatic dislocation.  Rather, by constantly de-articulating moments into elements, 
axiomatization accelerates and stimulates the activity of difference—more new identities, 
cheaper, and faster, in order to keep up with or to resist run-away de-coding.  Insofar as 
they act counter the operation of a logic of axiomatic equivalence, equivalential chains 
are also deterritorialized and partially fixed social identities become visible again as 
floating elements.  
Thus, the historical operation of capitalist axiomatization is to effect an evermore 
rapid decoding of socio-symbolic orders, transforming assemblages of elements and 
articulated moments into elemental flows.  If the present source of our political optimism 
lies in the proliferation of unarticulated elements that allows for a political struggle for 
hegemony to take place through practices of articulation, then this situation can be 
attributed, at least, in part, to the operation of capitalist axiomatization. Late capitalism is 
characterized by the constant courting and displacing of the limit of absolute dislocation.  
It may be just this acceleration of de-coding (of essentialist class identities, for example) 104
that has multiplied and finally made visible elements qua elements in socio-political 
space in the same way that an earlier acceleration made possible the discovery of labour 
power qua labour power.
Although Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist semiotics can provide some 
resources for rethinking capitalism within an understanding of the social field as a socio-
symbolic order, there remain a number of perhaps unbridgeable gaps between 
schizoanalysis and discourse theory.  Axiomatization will likely prove only a provisional 
model for reformulating the specificity of contemporary capitalism in the theoretical 
terrain of socio-symbolic analysis. 105
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